

EMPATHY, FORM, AND SPACE

PROBLEMS IN GERMAN AESTHETICS.

1873-1893

ON THE OPTICAL SENSE OF FORM:
A CONTRIBUTION TO AESTHETICS

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Yet what is beautiful appears blessed in itself!
—Eduard Mörike, "Auf eine Lampe"

PREFACE

The present work was prompted by the discussion of pure form, which my father first defined as a focal point of aesthetic investigation in the critique of his aesthetics.^{*} If, as he maintains against the Herbartian school, there can be no form without content, then it must be shown that those forms devoid of emotional life to which that school refers with some semblance of plausibility are supplied with emotional content that we—the observers—unwittingly transfer to them. Only in a few places in his *Aesthetik* did my father suggest this notion of form, for instance, in the chapter on architecture (1851)^{**} and in his theory of natural beauty (1847).^{***} In both sections he explains that the aesthetic effect of all inorganic phenomena,

^{*}Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Kritik meiner Aesthetik," in idem, *Kritische Gänge*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: Costa, 1886).

^{**}Friedrich Theodor Vischer, *Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft der Schönheit* (Reutlingen: Mäcker, 1851), vol. 3, sec. 561.

^{***}*Ibid.* (1847), vol. 2, secs. 340–69.

even the lower organic world of plants and the whole realm of landscape, appears with an intuitive investment on our part, that is to say, we involuntarily read our emotions into them.¹ Later he highlights this concept and develops it under the term *symbolism of form* (*Formsymbolik*). He defines it as a "rapt, inward sense of the unity of image and content"² [*inniger Zusammenhang des Bildes und des Inhalts*], which historically has led primitive religions to "confound" the two. This is different from the psychically necessary symbolism of form intrinsic to human imagination in general. In the latter case we maintain our freedom to perceive the symbolic process as nothing more than an analogy.

Yet how do we arrive at this deep, dark, secure, intimate, yet free, unifying, and contractive feeling [*Zusammenföhlung*]?³ "We will have to assume that every mental act is brought about and is at the same time reflected in certain vibrations and—who knows what—neural modifications, in such a way that the latter represent its image, that is to say, they produce a symbolic picture inside the organism. Those external phenomena that have such a particular effect on us, into which we unwittingly read our emotional moods, must relate to this internal picture as its objective representation and interpretation. The natural phenomenon accords with the related vibrations, stimulates them, strengthens and confirms them, and with that the emotional state reflects itself in them."⁴ "The various dimensions in lines and planes, the differences in their movements [...] have a symbolic effect. The vertical elevates; the horizontal broadens; the curve moves more energetically than the straight line: reminding us of the way in which the course of inner life alternately trends away from and toward given points and laws."⁵

This is a theme that many have touched upon, although only in passing. C. W. Völker made the first concerted effort to do justice to this question in his *Analyse und Symbolik* (Analysis and symbolism), a thoughtful text to which I owe much encouragement and guidance for my own observations.⁶ Yet even though the author very completely and accurately identifies the phenomena that he confronts, he fails to define clearly the main concepts that concern us here and around which all of these impressions revolve. He himself freely admits this failing in his

¹ Vischer, *Kritische Gänge*, 140.

² *Ibid.*, 141.

³ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 144–45.

⁶ C. Wilhelm Völker, *Analyse und Symbolik: Hypothesen aus der Formensicht* (Leipzig: R. Weigel, 1901).

preface. Incidentally, apart from personal reasons, it is always quite natural for such daring attempts to have the character of an obscure and primitive upsurge of thought, for they are undertaken with almost no traditional premises or support from predecessors. It is a turbid, fermenting must—a new wine—that the author presents to us. Unfortunately, he occasionally forgets, when serving up another man's wine, to attach a "label" to the bottle.⁷

The term "symbolism of form" was first defined and applied to aesthetics in a systematic way by Karl Köstlin; he based it in particular on the notion of "associations of ideas."⁸ The author began his analysis by referring to music, where the aural forms evoke a living, "reminiscent" visualization of "themes," which "in themselves specifically characterize" these (aural) forms, so that upon hearing them "we can believe that we can see and perceive these themes together with the sound" ("sweet, mild" tones are conducive to mental tranquillity).⁹ Further, music "indirectly imitates the theme symbolically through allusions to the imagined theme."¹⁰ With regard to spatial phenomena, we are also conscious that "one form can remind us of another, can be a symbol for another form, as when body size becomes a symbol of spiritual greatness, significance, and maturity."¹¹ "All quantitative characteristics of form recall their corresponding qualitative ones; all sensuous characteristics remind us of the corresponding mental characteristics of form."¹² "Just as the human mind is sufficiently active to be reminded of something by seeing something similar, it is also sufficiently occupied with, directed toward, and conscious of itself to find everywhere resemblances between external things and its own mental states, experiences, sensations [*Empfindungen*], moods, emotions, and passions. It finds in everything a counterpart to itself and a symbol of its humanity."¹³

⁷ *Ibid.*, 127. "Religion is a nostalgia of the intellect for its truth and on this is based the transcendence over finitude as well as the second of the last divided elements converging into a higher unity" [*Die Religion ist ein Heimweh des Geistes nach seiner Wahrheit und hierauf ist schon die Transzendenz oder aller Endliche, sowie die Einigung des getheilten Zustandesmoments der sich Hinföhlenswerten in einen höheren Sammelpunkt als Convergenz begründet*]. Compare Fr. Vischer, *Ästhetik oder Wissenschaften der Schönten*, I: 170. "Religion is a nostalgia of the spirit for its own truth. Transcendence in religion is conditioned by this" [*Die Religion ist ein Heimweh des Geistes nach seiner Wahrheit. Schon dadurch ist die Transzendenz in der Religion bedingt*], and so on.

⁸ Karl Köstlin, *Ästhetik* (Tübingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1889), 322–26.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 322.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 324.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 325.

The longer I concerned myself with this concept of a pure symbolism of form, the more it seemed to me possible to distinguish between ideal associations and a direct merger of the imagination [Hinsinnung] with objective form. This latter possibility became clear to me with the help of Karl Albert Schemer's book *Das Leben des Traums* (The life of the dream). This profound work, feverishly probing hidden depths, contains a veritable wealth of highly instructive examples that make it possible for any reader who finds himself unsympathetic with the mystical form of the generally abstract passages to arrive at an independent conclusion. Particularly valuable in an aesthetic sense is the section on "Die symbolische Grundformation für die Leibreize" (Symbolic basic formation for bodily stimuli).¹ Here it was shown how the body, in responding to certain stimuli in dreams, objectifies itself in spatial forms. Thus it unconsciously projects its own bodily form—and with this also the soul—into the form of the object. From this I derived the notion that I call "empathy" [Einfühlung]. Soon, however, I realized that this notion would only in part explain the symbolism of form, for the effect of light and color, the contour, and the pure line cannot be described by empathy. Here one can only assume a direct continuation of the external sensation into an internal one, a direct mental sublimation of the sensory response. At the same time I became aware of the all-important distinction between sensory and kinesthetic stimuli. I placed this distinction at the head of my basic scheme, from which I distinguished between a sensory "immediate feeling" and a kinesthetic "responsive feeling"—analogously, between a sensory and kinesthetic empathy.²

My principal concern in developing these concepts now became to explain mental stimulation in every case precisely through and together with bodily stimulation. Although the physiological knowledge at my disposal is inadequate for this task, it seems to me that the manner of its application is valid in itself and not unworthy of being carried forward and completed by the sure hand of a specialist in this field. We stand here before a "mystery that has to be explained by physiology in conjunction with psychology."³ The attempt has to be made now, and in

¹Karl Albert Schemer, *Das Leben des Traums* (Berlin: Heinrich Schöndler, 1861), 114.

²Only after completing the present work did I become aware of Hermann Lotze's *Mikrokosmos* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1856–1864), I: 199, in which, without attempting a systematic overview, he also speaks of a "sympathetic projection" [mitlebende Hinsinnung] that is related to a "generalized memory of the activity of our own body" [verallgemeinerte Erinnerung an die Regungen unseres eigenen Körpers]. The examples used on page 200 correlate to our concept of kinesthetic empathy.

³Vascher, *Kritische Gänge*, 142.

the end the daily—even hourly—discoveries will at least begin to illuminate the "impenetrable darkness that envelops those areas where the soul and the nerve centers are one."⁴ It seems to be "an impossible task ever to construct a system in this dark realm on the basis of our few observations."⁵ Nevertheless, with the help of some generally known features of our physical life I have ventured to undertake a preliminary and simple analysis of the structure of our imagination. Although much may still sound immature and problematic, it may also throw a faint light on the dark paths of the genesis of our feeling for symbolic form.

—H. Vascher, Stuttgart, 22 April 1872

THE SPATIAL UNDERSTANDING OF FORMS

There is a way of seeing [Sehen] without any special effort, a way of mere looking that relies on physical activity only insofar as certain groups of nerves are tensed. I do not mean here that focused concentration of vision, ignoring everything around it, whereby we fix on just one part of the whole like a marksman. The latter is an abstract, purposeful seeing that can only be of interest to us here to the extent to which the observed part is of sufficient size to be perceived as an *ὄργανον* [organon] discernible in itself (stone, wave, leaf, branch, bush). We are concerned now with simply taking in the represented image—the straightforward, broad, undifferentiated pursuit of the phenomenon as a whole, or objectively speaking, the simple reproduction or photographic impression of the object on our retina. Upon closer inspection, however, we find that a concentrated vision is also working here as we, without being aware of it, focus on a center inseparable from its surroundings, which is conditioned on the one hand by our standpoint (position of the head, direction of the eyes, visual angle) and on the other hand by the salient feature of the object itself (light).

This simple seeing is always a relatively unconscious process, for the impression received is still undifferentiated. It is nothing more than a dreamlike appearance of an ensemble, but it is vital to any concrete understanding of space. It is a characteristic of the spatial object that it appears to human perception as something side by side and therefore as an instantaneous presentation of its idea [Idee]. Our body thus all at once receives an aggregate of nerve vibrations; our mind thus has the first present flash of an inner conception. We might point out here that

⁴Ibid., 142–43.

⁵Ibid., 146.

this is also the first fateful step to all artistic intuition: an artist must have an "eye."

It is necessary to break up this dull mass of the impression and find our bearings amid its relationships. We achieve this by muscular activity, by moving the eye while looking at the object; that is, by scanning [*Schauen*]. Scanning is a much more active process than seeing, because it does not simply rely on the natural impulse to seek a relative whole; instead, our eye wanders up and down, left and right, making contact with the individual dimensions. In this process we can distinguish two approaches: the first is linear, whereby I define the contours with my fingertips, so to speak; the second (this is the natural and less reflective approach of the two) is a mapping of the masses, whereby I run my hand, as it were, over the planes, convexities, and concavities of an object, the paths of light,* the slopes, ridges, and hollows of the mountain.** In both cases the movement can be either intermittent and concentrated (dappled light through the foliage) or smooth and flowing.

Scanning is more conscious than mere seeing, for it sets out to analyze the forms dialectically (by separating and reconnecting the elements) and to bring them into a mechanical relationship. Scanning alone makes a complete artistic presentation possible, for its movement, as will be shown, is accompanied by an impelling animation of the dead phenomenon, a rhythmic enlivening and revitalization of it.

And now, once I have accomplished the process of scanning, the impression of seeing is repeated on a higher level. What I have seemingly separated I have reassembled into an ordered and restful unity. Again I have an enclosed, complete image, but one developed and filled with emotion. To chaotic "Being" I called "Become!"—and my Summons brought Light and behold, it was Good.

Yet before we go further, we must say a word about the indispensable *auxiliary* and corrector of the eye—the sensitive and mobile hand. I have already found myself unable to refrain from referring to touch in a symbolic sense. In truth, however, there is a very real and intimate connection between the two organs. Their functions are of a kindred nature: touching is a "cruder scanning at close range"; seeing is a "more subtle touching at a distance."*** "One cannot fulfill its task without the other. If I were blind, I would lack the experience of distance as well as of light and color; without the sense of touch, I would lack definite information about tangible form. The child learns to see by touching, and indeed we should not disre-

*Light and color can also be analyzed for their spatial positions and dimensions.

**The first relates to drawing, the second to a plastic-painterly attitude. Attractive examples are the silhouette and the relief in their respective stages of development.

***Gustav Adolph Lindner, *Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie als induktive Wissenschaft*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Gerold, 1872), 53, 96.

gard the fact that this invariably entails not only skin and nerve functions but also muscle movements. Touch is especially important in learning to "grasp" distant objects, which in visual terms are foreshortened and distorted. As is well known, children reach for the moon as we reach for a plate. Stereoscopic vision provides us with only a planar visual field, and we would inevitably believe that all parts of this field were equidistant from us were it not for the experience gained from our tactile sense: we push the planar visual field away from us with our hand, and thus is laid the foundation for the third dimension of space—depth.

VISUAL SENSATION

By sensation I mean the sensory process only and, more particularly, the sensory response to an observed object. The first distinction to be made is between emphatic and unemphatic sensations. An image perceived unconsciously is unemphatic, vague, and indifferent. I fail to become aware of any stimulus because its impression offers so little stimulation. This is the case, for example, with a practical perception, in which the stimulus serves only as a means to another function; nothing more needs to be said about this. Here we are interested only in emphatic, intense, that is to say, pleasant or unpleasant sensations. The artistic eye recognizes no such thing as an indifferent image; it regards seeing as eminently an end in itself and concerns itself only with degrees of emphasis. Pleasurable sensations are produced by those stimuli that have the beneficial effect of stimulating nerves and muscles into congenial movements, that is, movements familiar and simple. Unpleasant sensations, on the contrary, are caused by stimuli that have an inhibitory effect, leading to unusual, difficult, and uncongenial movements. Yet once these are compensated for and liberated with the aid of congenial movements, this contrast gives us an increased sensation of pleasure. The converse goes without saying.

The criterion of sensation lies, I believe, in the concept of similarity. This is not so much a harmony within an object as a harmony between the object and the subject, which arises because the object has a harmonious form and formal effect corresponding to subjective harmony. But first let us take a closer look at the concepts of repose and motion. The only true repose is that of law, which is the stable form or ideal frame within which motion occurs. However, in contrast to the passive process of a sensory or pure nerve function, I would describe the active process of a motor-nerve function—a muscular movement—as motion, especially because it is based on a far better-defined and stronger act of the will. Whether similar or dissimilar, the form of the object thus relates to our bodily form, as well as to its

conditioned forms of motion, only with the aid of hidden or apparent kinesthetic stimuli, that is to say, through nerve or muscle sensations.

In distinguishing between nerves and muscles, we of course do not deny that the muscle also has nerves or that "scanning" always implies a "seeing." Similarly, when I call the physical response and condition of sensory stimulation the *immediate sensation* [*Zuermpfindung*] and that of motor stimulation the *responsive sensation* [*Nachempfindung*], the latter must follow from the former.

Of prime importance for our sense of light is, of course, light itself. Its effect, as is well known, is based on movements or fluctuations of the light aether; the effect of color simply derives from the variations in the speed of this motion or in the wavelength of the light. It is now generally supposed, among other things, that the eye possesses three different kinds of nerve groups sensitive to light (red, green, and violet, or red, green, and blue).¹⁰ If this is true, irrespective of whether the light produces an agreeable vibration in the respective nerve group through the regular (not glaring or flickering) form of its wave movement, a simple light or a simple isolated color has a pleasant or an unpleasant effect depending on whether the nerve group is generally inclined to react or not. Such a tendency can only reside in a latent stimulus to vibration in one of the eye's other two nerve groups. A color consisting of two basic primary hues is attractive if it stimulates a comfortable combination of nerve vibrations. The same is true, of course, of juxtaposed colors. This theory implies that even within the nerve system something like symmetry exists, thus explaining the need for slight contrasts in the parts producing the color effect. A remarkable demonstration of this resides in the so-called aftereffect of color contrasts, which can probably be traced to the effects of reflex stimuli on idle nerves within the eye.¹¹

The different dimensions, paths, directions, and partial positions of light and color phenomena can also be observed in the muscular movements of the eye; then we are dealing with responsive sensations. These will never be as vivid as the actual motion of the object (flash of lightning), where the contrast between the moving and resting parts, or between the variously moving parts of the image, always has a surprising and arresting effect. But it is precisely these more subtle emotions, which are so easily overlooked and underestimated, that I must now address in greater detail.

Since the responsive sensation in this case experiences light or color as a juxtaposition of discrete bodies and thus disregards its actual unity, we too prefer

¹⁰Wilhelm Wundt, *Vorlesungen über die Menschheit- und Tierpsychik* (Leipzig: F. Vieweg, 1863), I: 358.

¹¹*Ibid.*, vol. 2, Lecture 35, p. 77.

to present the formal entities that stimulate these subjective motions as discrete bodies, that is, as fixed forms.

Wundt writes: "Owing to its physiological structure, when the eye moves freely, it follows a straight line in vertical and horizontal directions, but it travels in an arc when moving in every oblique direction."¹² This principle can also be stated negatively: the straight line in an oblique direction is initially experienced as offensive because it requires uncomfortable movements; the zigzag line placed in a straight direction (vertical or horizontal) is also initially offensive, for it requires unfamiliar and rapid changes of movement.¹³

Furthermore, we gladly follow spatial extensions in which a certain form is repeated at regular intervals. Even more pleasing are those extensions in which the repetitions (main forms) are interrupted by methodically inserted variations (secondary forms). On this principle is based the rhythmic impression of form, which is nothing other than the pleasant overall sensation of a harmonic series of successful self-motions.

But apart from color and the degree of brightness, what differentiates the immediate sensation of the fixed form? I believe we may answer boldly: the similarity or dissimilarity of the object, first with regard to the structure of the eye and second with regard to the structure of the whole body. The horizontal line is pleasing because our eyes are positioned horizontally,¹⁴ although without any other contrasting form it may verge on monotony. The vertical line, on the contrary, can be disturbing when perceived in isolation, for in a certain sense it contradicts the binocular structure of the perceiving eyes and forces them to function in a more complicated way. In relation to the blandness of the other dimensions, this disturbance is of course experienced as a welcome change and forceful stimulus. The circle—a plate, a loop, or a sphere—by contrast has an immediately pleasing effect because it conforms to the rounded shape of the eye.

In general, we find all regular forms pleasing because our organs and their functional forms are regular. Irregular forms bother us, to use Wundt's apt phrase, like "an unfulfilled expectation." The eye is trained to find no trace of the laws that govern its organization and movement.

Yet even here, in the realm of the mere sensation, it is a matter not only of mere regularity but also of an organic norm; even the laws of symmetry and proportion, which the formalists have proposed as relevant criteria, can easily be subsumed under this viewpoint. Total regularity occurs only in certain parts of the

¹²*Ibid.*, 80.

¹³Volkelt, *Analyse und Symbolik*, 16.

human body (the eye), and accordingly we like to see it in part of the object. Symmetry may be multilateral or bilateral; the latter may be either horizontal or vertical. Again, we find that horizontal symmetry always presents a better effect than vertical symmetry because of its analogy with our body. In the vertical direction, a different law of form seems more appropriate—the law of proportion or the “golden section.” According to Adolf Zeising, this means that the relation of the smaller to the larger part should be the same as the relation of the larger to the whole. This is not the place to trace the various nuances of this law or its interaction with the law of symmetry, especially as aesthetic formalism itself does not yet appear to have clarified this issue. We must rest content with the general statement that these laws of regularity, symmetry, and proportion are nothing other than subjective laws of the normal human body and, as such, must have some value for aesthetics, even if—for all that—only a most elementary and limited value.*

But what does this have to do with our concept of similarity? To adopt a direct, purely sensory analogy in order to prove the similarity between objective and subjective form can lead to fruitful results only if we consider both the direct visual impression and the indirect effect of the reflexes. Sight alone is insufficient to make such a comparison; the latter is possible only when we take into consideration the stimuli that affect the whole body. Demonstrating this entire process is a difficult task, for we are much less aware of a generalized physical sensation than of an isolated one.

We can often observe in ourselves the curious fact that a visual stimulus is experienced not so much with our eyes as with a different sense in another part of our body. When I cross a hot street in the glaring sun and put on a pair of dark blue glasses, I have the momentary impression that my skin is being cooled off. Similarly, we speak of “loud colors” because their shrillness does indeed induce an offensive sensation in our auditory nerves. In rooms with low ceilings our whole body feels the sensation of weight and pressure. Walls that have become crooked with age offend our basic sense of physical stability. The perception of exterior limits to a form can combine in some obscure way with the sensation of my own physical boundaries, which I feel on, or rather with, my own skin. Even the muscular move-

*I believe one can refute the apparent contradiction that horizontal proportionality and vertical symmetry can occasionally be pleasing with the response: (1) either the posture of the body is subjectively seen as reclining (see the section, “Imagination”); or (2) a manifold of vertical body forces standing next to one another is imagined; or (3) isolated rhythmic stimuli to muscle movements (responsive sensations) are initiated, act in motion by the quiet effect of the space. The truth may reside in the mystical union of these three possibilities.

ments of the eyes (or head) induce movements in other organs, especially in the tactile organs. They can also produce sensory nerve stimuli in the same way that the latter can cause motor stimuli. Likewise, mental stimuli can bring about motor stimuli in the lower organs, and vice versa.** The whole body is involved; the entire physical being is moved. For in the body there is, strictly speaking, no such process as localization. Thus each emphatic sensation ultimately leads to a strengthening or a weakening of the general *visual sensation*.

This is certainly not the place to enlarge upon the strict distinction between purely aesthetic and pathological behavior; however, it is essential to emphasize that seeing can be taken here in the pure sense as an end in itself, and therefore all material interference and stimulation can be excluded. As soon as such feelings appear, pure perception ceases and yields its place to an impure one (secondary purpose), that is to say, to passions of desire or recoil. The sum of free artistic vision shines on the just and unjust alike; nevertheless, it brings victory to the former. Negative stimuli are isolated and overcome by concentrating on and accentuating the positive. When this fails, we recoil. Yet we are supported by our own body's instinct and disposition toward perfection, by virtue of which we attach ourselves to the dominant unity and pass over all discontinuity.

IMAGINATION

A kinesthetic stimulus does not always and necessarily lead to actual movement but always to the idea of it. Imagination is an act by which we mentally simulate something that previously existed as a vague content of our sensation as sensations, concrete form. If we then apply the same word to abstract thoughts, we thereby imply that these too are accompanied by mental images. Our concern henceforth is thus with mental activity. That this activity also essentially involves the central nervous system is evident from the unity of body and mind. The brain itself functions on many levels.**

There are ideas of my own (bodily) form and of other forms; again, some ideas are objective and others subjective. We will speak only of the latter here, as only they concern aesthetics. When I visualize in my mind an absent object, I imagine the object. When I visualize in my mind my own body, I am performing a subjective

**These reflexes or reciprocal vibrations of the senses are the physical cause of the unity of the arts.

**Schreier, *Das Leben des Traums*, 85.

tive—shall we say—*imagining of the self*. We encounter the latter in its most unconscious, darkest form in lower organic life. The embryos in the mother's womb can only grow according to a basic underlying image: an idea. And indeed we have to assume that this idea is not simply a model but at the same time the driving, effective force.*

The imagining of the self becomes conscious when it relates itself, either positively or negatively, to an object or to an idea of an object. The dream—that blind half-brother of genius—shows us a mysterious combination of the two. Daily experience or reality provides the material for dreams, although they are formed by bodily stimuli. The images serve only to mirror subjective moods, which they do as follows: the stimulated parts (nerves, muscles) are imitated by analogies to their shape (usually on an enlarged scale) with the help of an object only remotely similar. As Scherner demonstrates with a wealth of examples, the dream likes to use the representation of a house and its parts, in particular, to allude to the body as a whole or to its parts.** I might dream of a dangerously overhanging oriel of a house, for instance, because my head is hanging down over the side of the bed. With visual stimuli, the dream might choose the image of the roof beams of a house to represent the fibers of the stimulated retina. If the stimulus is very strong, the beams might be imagined as being on fire. I might dream of being in a room in which the whole ceiling is covered with spiderwebs; on the right-hand side of the ceiling huge, hideous spiders are darting about; I awake with a headache, with a stabbing pain in the upper right part of my skull. Such symbolization is not restricted to architectural forms: a tree, a rock, even a constructed tool, such as a table or a cart, may serve as a simile for the human body. Thus an overly filled stomach, for example, may be portrayed as an inflated bagpipe or as a round box crammed with cookies.***

A motor stimulus can certainly also be expressed by energetic and grotesque spatial forms (for instance, wildly jagged mountains); more typically, however, it is represented by actual images of movement. Thus in the case of visual motor stimuli, one might see parrots or fireflies flying, shooting stars falling, white-clad cooks jumping around, or solemn, colorful processions parading through the streets. If I am sleeping with my knee bent and I involuntarily stretch it out in response to a corrective muscle stimulus, I might imagine being thrown from a tower or seeing someone else being thrown. On a larger scale, the change in the position of my

*Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (Berlin: C. Duncker, 1889).

**Scherner, *Das Leben des Traums*, the section on the symbolic basic formations for bodily stimuli, 114–27.

****Ibid.*, 121, 183, 207, 210, most interesting.

knee might correspond to a changed distance (in the dream) from the ground.* Here, however, the dream more definitively selects a personal image of my own or someone else's body. This is a sign of the mind's determination—of a half-attained control of the center over the periphery—which is best expressed in the imagining (dreaming) actions and conversations. Scherner calls them "mental stimuli."

Yet this whole realm of dreams remains so dark and difficult to decipher because it is a veritable Gordian knot of changing stimuli. Spiritual ideas, for instance, dreams of indecision, may cloak themselves in masks of hesitant body movements or vice versa. Likewise, auditory stimuli can induce visual stimuli, formal stimuli can induce motile stimuli or ideas of motile stimuli, and so on.

These obscure mechanisms of stimulated images can be traced in a similar way in our waking imagination. With careful introspection it is not difficult to see that apart from the more specific abstractions there exists a state of pure absorption in which we imagine this or that phenomenon in accordance with the unconscious need for a surrogate for our body-ego. As in a dream, I stimulate, on the basis of simple nerve sensations, a fixed form that symbolizes my body or an organ of it. Conversely, an objective but accidentally experienced phenomenon always provokes a related idea of the self in sensory or motor form. It does not matter whether the object is imagined or actually perceived; as soon as our idea of the self is projected into it, it always becomes an imagined object; an appearance. The way in which the phenomenon is constructed also becomes an analogy for my own structure. I wrap myself within its contours as in a garment. Or conversely, I might imagine myself moving along the line of a range of hills guided by kinesthetic imagination (be it direct or mediated by the reflex stimuli of sensitized nerves). In the same way, fleeting clouds might carry me far away. This is no longer seeing [*Sehen*] but a watching [*Zusehen*]: the forms appear to move, but only we move in the imagination. We move in and with the forms. We caress their spatial discontinuities. We scale this fir tree and reach up within it; we plunge into that abyss, and so forth.

If we now look back at our original notion of sensation, we find it vitally enlarged and deepened by the imagination. It is enlarged insofar as it gives rise to a specific sensation of an image, which can appear purely as such (without a visible object) or in and with the sensation of reality (idea of one's own self). It is deepened insofar as it is now capable of departing from a relation of mere form (isolation) and penetrating into the phenomenon. The immediate sensation may remain

**Ibid.*, 164, 183.

completely external; but it may also go deeper and crystallize in a **resting, permanent, empathetic sensation** [*Eimingsfindung*]. The **responsive sensation** may likewise remain external, or with the aid of the imagination it might insinuate itself into the forms as a **kinetic, volitional, empathetic sensation**. This is true, as we have seen, even with regard to immobile (subjectively mobile) forms.

We see that the imagination is a hybrid. It is a fluid medium in which contradictions of the world—*repose and motion, self and nonself*—merge into a mysterious whole.

If we now compare imagination and perception as they relate to the character of the image, the former, as a substitute for the real presence of the latter, manifests the inner freedom of undisturbed, unlimited concentration. The imagination lacks the clarity of reality but also its illusions. The form becomes, so to speak, clarified—spiritualized—by being internal. This independence from the narrow constraints of reality, on the other hand, may also make the material stimulus doubly effective.

As long as the precise and exacting discipline of reality is lacking, it is possible to exaggerate everything, including the material stimulus. In this talent for exaggeration, the imagination reveals itself as a power of visualization, which in turn has the unique advantage of being able to construct a self-generated, relatively new image. Yet it remains, as such, always prone to the immature tendency to be subjective, private, and capricious. Only the inward imagination* truly abstracts from the confusion and irrationality of nature; it alone, guided by the unconscious norm of physical perfection, is capable of producing harmonious individual forms and microcosms. For all their purity, these remain inner creations with a nebulous quality; they achieve the desired development and clarity when the hand of art—outward imagination—conducts them back to a state of tangible reality.

FEELING AND EMOTION

In sensing and imagining the object, the activity of perception does not, however, imply a truly emotional contact with that object. Sensation has yet to advance through its partial or total implication with ideas to the stage of a psychic feeling.

Before this can happen, a spiritual value or vital force has to be perceived

*What we mean by imagination will become clear from the following. For it is not a special power of our soul but only a specific collaboration of its three main forces: emotion, representation, and will.

within the phenomenon; the human being must pass through the realm of experience and education. We gird ourselves with all our ambitious self-awareness and set out to live and work. An unquenchable impulse to gratify ourselves, to preserve ourselves, and to enhance our own strength spurs us on, and our well-being and mood depend on a favorable outcome. Do these utilitarian achievements, as reflected in subjective states, indeed possess a human character? Who would deny that the farmer is downcast when his crop is damaged by hail or elated when the weather is favorable? And yet as long as this farmer supposes that he alone is affected, the difference between his feeling and his sensation can only be one of degree. Feeling directed exclusively toward oneself is a dull, sterile emotion; it strives on its own accord to reach out beyond itself and yearns for a reciprocal feeling elsewhere. Only by considering our fellow beings do we ascend to a true emotional life. This natural love for my species is the only thing that makes it possible for me to project myself mentally; with it, I feel not only myself but at the same time the feeling of another being.

A pure and complete union between the subjective and objective imagination (intuition) can take place only when the latter involves another human being. This is also true of any mental feeling, however selfish it might be, provided that this selfishness is capable of comparing itself with another's selfishness. Sensation, in conjunction with the imagination, achieves only a dubious comparison with the outward, peripheral, or unthinking aspect of the phenomena. With feeling, however, we cast a warmer look toward their spiritual core without relinquishing the solidity of their bodily presence. Instead of something presenting itself as a physical convenience or hindrance, there now appears a living individual or a community of individuals that either sympathizes with and supports us, our living situation, and our vital instincts, or unfeelingly and spitefully works against us. The criterion of nerve and muscle activity—as it applied above, in the discussion of sensation, to the form of the impression—is valid here too as a criterion for the significant activity of life in general. And the harmonious relation between subject and object deepens here into just such a relation between subject and subject. Feeling, therefore, rests on a furtherance or a disturbance of the well-being of the entire person; an individual vital force unique to its own kind.

With that—notwithstanding the mute protestations of our own feelings—we banish from the world of feeling every inanimate objective form, which we leave to appeal exclusively to sensation or to abstract thought. The viewing soul, therefore, feels a phenomenon only when the latter supplies the language of feeling from its own resources. More than a few minds—sober by nature or in a sober mood—may already have asked in all seriousness whether, in fact, they have any right to

pay the hourly, spontaneous tribute of feeling that they pay to inanimate nature. What have a resplendent rainbow, the firmament above, or the earth below to do with the dignity of my humanity? I can love all that lives, all that creeps and flies, such things are akin to me; but my kinship with the elements is too remote to require any kind of compassion on my part. What are space and time to me? What are projections, dimensions, rest, and movement? What are all those forms to me through which the red blood of life does not flow? I do not measure my heart with the same yardstick as I do a lump of stone. Where there is no life—precisely there do I miss it.

At this point, however, our feeling rises up and takes the intellect at its word: yes, we miss red-blooded life, and precisely because we miss it, we imagine the dead form as living.

We have seen how the perception of a pleasing form evokes a pleasurable sensation and how such an image symbolically relates to the idea of our own bodies—or conversely, how the imagination seeks to experience itself through the image. We thus have the wonderful ability to project and incorporate our own physical form into an objective form,¹⁴ in much the same way as wild fowls gain access to their quarry by concealing themselves in a blind. What can that form be other than the form of a content identical with it? It is therefore our own personality that we project into it.

Thus I project my own life into the lifeless form, just as I quite justifiably do with another living person. Only ostensibly do I keep my own identity although the object remains distinct. I seem merely to adapt and attach myself to it as one hand clasps another, and yet I am mysteriously transplanted and magically transformed into this Other.

We have now reached the point where we have to look more closely at this act of the imagination that we earlier called inward sensation, and we must define its human value.

When I observe a stationary object, I can without difficulty place myself within its inner structure, at its center of gravity. I can think my way into it, mediate its size with my own, stretch and expand, bend and confine myself to it. With a small object, partially or totally confined and constricted, I very precisely concentrate my feeling. My feeling will be compressed and modest (a star, a flower—true reality; a tight belt—a contractive feeling). When, on the contrary, I see a large or partially overproportioned form, I experience a feeling of mental grandeur and breadth, a freedom of will (a building, water, air—true reality; a loose cloak—an expansive feeling [*Ausfaltung*]). More specifically, the compressed or upward striving, the bent or broken impression of an object fills us with a corresponding men-

tal feeling of oppression, depression, or aspiration, a submissive or shattered state of mind.

We wish to call this lingering, motionless *empathy* with the static form of the phenomenon *physiognomic* or emotional. We see this as a pure condition, an involuntary inclination and habitus. It contrasts with the *winking, acting, or affective* empathy of a truly or apparently moved object. An object is apparently moved insofar as we think it is just about to be moved or has just been moved. We seem to perceive hints and traces of attitudes, of emotions—a secret, scarcely suppressed twitching of the limbs, a timorous yearning, a posturing, and a stammering. These signs are instantly translated into their corresponding human meaning. A cliff appears to stand at attention and squarely face us; we therefore read spiritual *defiance* into it.¹⁵ Its projecting angle seems to lunge out as if affected by a *passion* (impatience, curiosity, anger); it appears "to step forward."¹⁶ In the branches of a tree we spread our arms *longingly*, and so on. We may go further: the suggestive facial expression is inwardly carried out or repeated. The static form is empathetically felt as if it could move freely. If by motion (real or apparent) we understand a change of location, then it is crucial whether the size of the moved body be large (the undulating curve of a mountain, drifting clouds) or small (wavelets, a shooting star, a will-o'-the-wisp). If, however, we understand motion to be a genetic change of self, then we must also speak of a genetic expansion and contraction of feeling. In its contractive form (ice melting),¹⁷ this feeling of becoming is always synonymous with a weakening or renunciation of the self, while in its expansive form (expanding, concentric rings in water), it is synonymous with a strengthening and liberation of the self. The same feeling of a change of state can also accompany a change of position (an avalanche hurtling down and growing, the fading light of falling fireworks).

In the course of our analysis, we will recognize this central, genuine empathy toward pure form to be the natural mother of religious personification. The apparent difficulty that it cannot be applied to vegetable and animal personifications is easily overcome by the inference of a metaphor: a detour that our mythical and aesthetic imagination has taken, utilizing the specialized physical capacities of the animal and plant worlds as aids to the self-objectivization of man's own mental

¹⁴Köselm, *Ästhetik*, 307.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Even a volume at rest can be taken as contractive or expansive, especially a rounded form that reminds us of the organic and elastic life of muscles and flesh.

powers.² With organic nature, empathy functions symbolically to animate a plant and to anthropomorphize an animal; only toward other human beings does it act as a doubling of self. Yet even in the latter case, a kind of symbolic projection is possible through the abstraction of details (fantastic hair, prominent nose). We are also reminded here of stories of the spontaneous resuscitation of a corpse and the many legends that tell of skeletons engaged in nocturnal dances and the dead walking abroad. In medieval legends the devil takes possession of a corpse and causes it to behave as if alive—for instance, the tale of a Parisian nobleman whom the devil seduced by animating the corpse of a beautiful girl recently hanged.³

But what of the immediate and responsive sensation? To all appearances, these are condemned to a formal externality and must therefore be described as purely sensory functions. There is in imagination a prompt stimulation and pulsation (immediate sensation) and a successive enveloping, embracing, and caressing of the object (responsive sensation), whereby we project ourselves all the more intensively into the interior of the phenomenon, that is to say, there is an immediate sensation and a responsive sensation for the purpose of generating an empathetic sensation or empathy. We propose to call this **attentive feeling** [*Aufnehmung*].

But what value in terms of feeling do sensations have that observe phenomena strictly from the outside?

The responsive sensation considers only the outline of the form (mountain silhouette) or follows only the path of movement (flight of a bird apart from the bird itself),⁴ but it takes no account of the existence of the individual organism

²The comparison of organic with inorganic life should also not confine us. When, for example, Theoklitos compares the lion's leap to a piece of wood under tension "that slips from the wheelwright's grip and whirres through the air," he is not setting inorganic nature above organic nature. The former's exclusively mechanical and blind movements are felt purely as such, so strongly and convincingly that they may later serve as something endowed with a soul, the more so the more closely they resemble a particular organ (path and speed of movement). The further we descend into nature, the coarser it becomes, and the more easily it can be symbolized. Its forms are patchwork—dead material—and do not insist upon their independence, as living form does. Yet after I have in this way dissipated my strength on nature, it can now serve as a resurrected symbol for everything organic.

³See *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Mythologie und Sittenkunde* 4 (1859): 87–88. See also Wilhelm Heintz, *Der Werrsdorf* (Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 1862), 109.

⁴We have to distinguish from this a special kind of moving empathy that both adheres to the boundaries of the phenomenon and always remains within them. This is the case when a series of phenomena (such as a wooded mountain range) is surveyed in one receptive glance. This is an associated motion that, although it neglects the individual center, still remains within the phenomena. The responsive feeling, by contrast, follows the outline of the phenomenon,

or its real center. To trace the outline of a form is a self-movement, an act that is predominantly subjective: the form being no more than an arbitrary, willful, and unilateral means by which the body can enjoy itself. These purely sensory self-motions of the responsive sensation, however, are somehow reflected in thought processes that are affected in a more definite way. Thus the whole person and all his vital feeling are hurled into compassion. The apparent movement of form is thus unconsciously accompanied by a concrete emotional element of feeling that is inseparably bound up with the concept of human wholeness. When I, for instance, look at the undulations and curves in a road, my thoughts also trace them—sometimes with dreamy hesitation, sometimes at a bounding speed. I seek and find, ascend triumphantly and fall to destruction, and so on. The direction and tempo of this motion are related to the perceived form and thus emulate human impulses and passions. Thus the responsive sensation intensifies into a **responsive feeling** [*Nachfühlung*].

We should also point out in this context the obscure and generalized influence of the earth's gravity and the corresponding feeling of being bound to the earth's surface (a center, as before), which exists alongside our ability to move freely with the speed of thought. In contrast to this, there is a very personal and more independent way of proceeding, when imagination wanders unbridled within seemingly formless spaces (water, cloudless air). In this case it controls itself and can determine its own direction of movement at will. The only generalized stimulus here resides in the empathized softness and boundlessness of the elements (responsive feeling combined with an expansive feeling).

Yet even though this whole pleasure of self-motion is imagined, an objectivization nevertheless takes place; we have a strange knack of confusing our own feeling with that of nature. The road traced by the responsive feeling seems to hesitate and rush impatiently along its course. The bright air in which we float and dream seems itself to be dreaming.

The simple, related, immediate sensation experiences a similar intensification, which must act as a stimulus, impossible to trace further, on the formation of thoughts, and thereby it affects the mood of the whole person. We approach the image with confidence or with timidity; we let ourselves be charmed or repelled by it without going into detail or knowing why. Accordingly, we can also speak of an **immediate feeling** [*Zufühlung*], that is, an intuitive surge of youthful enthusiasm, which, although still inexperienced in the ways of the world, already harbors the whole world in its heart. The best illustration of this process is the most general, formal union of subject and object—the effect of light. It tangibly manifests itself only as warmth (skin sensation), and thus we speak of cold and warm shades of light, which are then identified with an icy reserve or with the love and

warmth of human feeling. The restful color blue produced by the longer waves fills us with a mild yearning; with its shorter waves, red has the effect of an exuberant, glowing vitality. The reflex sensations invoke an unspoken comparison with an imagined feeling of contrasting color. An actual combination of colors, on the other hand, will suggest a satisfactory balance or a baffling dizziness, depending on whether it confirms or negates the symmetry in the optic nerves. And even individual bodies, with all their tangible and visible qualities, appear (apart from this) all the more intimate the more they are affected by the quality of light and modifications of color. They become able to see; they acquire the characteristic look of life. Thus we find here, again, that peculiar confusion of our own stimulation with the thing that produces the stimulus: light and color in themselves appear to be angry, to jubilate, to mourn, and so on.

Enough—we maintain that even these seemingly formal modes of behavior acquire significance from specific notions of content, vital force, and vital movement.

If we now relate these different demonstrations of imagining feeling according to their origin and development, we find that the immediate feeling functions most directly. Pure superficiality affects me simply as such; or conversely, I attend solely to the outward appearance of the object. This is a direct intellectualization of sensory stimuli. The pure responsive feeling, on the contrary, is initially more a motor activity of the senses; later it becomes an act of the imagination that is decidedly indirect in nature. Yet by intellectualizing this real or imagined self-motion, the responsive feeling is always simple and direct in comparison to empathy. Like the immediate feeling, empathy leaves the self in a certain sense solitary. The outward appearance remains a source of unconscious enticement and subjection. Yet objective empathy is indirect insofar as it appears after those subjective, formal functions (attentive sensation for the purpose of empathy). It finds itself, as it were, through them and now imagines itself as turning toward the motor of the phenomenon. Only now—by virtue of this central projection, exchange, and return—does it take on a life of its own. It looks at its second self as it sits reshaped in the object and intuitively takes it back to itself, yet without discerning it clearly or knowing why. We can therefore say that empathy traces the object from the inside (the object's center) to the outside (the object's form), whereas the immediate feeling and responsive feeling (as attentive feeling) proceed from the outside (the object's form) to the inside (the object's center, empathy), but they can also altogether disregard the inner quality of an object.

Finally, in addition to this emotional symbolism of form, there is a further act of illusion, namely, the association of ideas, which is of only minor impor-

tance from the standpoint of formal creation. Purely from the perspective of a factual association it evokes an other-absent images, thoughts, and vital feelings that have nothing to do with the symbolism of form. An old, potted beer stein, for example, might remind me of some thirsty reveler who once held it. I thus think and feel a person, someone human, in addition to this stein. I can also find myself imagining the reveler in a shape and attitude suggested by this stein. Here empathy is asserting itself within the association of ideas. A famous modern painter finds a dirty, reddish-gold tassel in a colleague's house; he holds it up to the light, shakes it, and after playing with it for a while he goes home and paints: priests and cardinals solemnly assembled in a twilight hall, clad in ceremonial robes. In this neat anecdote, a pure symbolism of form and an association of ideas are remarkably combined, and it would prove very difficult to separate out the different parts in a strictly psychological way.

We must bear in mind and never forget that in every image the symbolizations of form discussed here always work together, first with each other and second with the associations of ideas. They become entwined into an inextricable whole, and only by virtue of this absolute interlocking and interplay does a true aesthetic appreciation of form arise.

If we now inquire into the reason for this remarkable merger of subject and object in the sentient imagination, we will perhaps find no other explanation than that—once again—such is the nature of feeling. This symbolizing activity can be based on nothing other than the pantheistic urge for union with the world, which can by no means be limited to our more easily understood kinship with the human species but must, consciously or unconsciously, be directed toward the universe. In a rudimentary way, sensation and sentient imagination have the same tendency. Sensation is the most primitive impulse of life and out of it evolve the more distinct acts of the imagination, volition, and cognition, and it thus constitutes the most primitive form of the sense of universal coherence. With and through this general advance, sensation itself changes into something else. It becomes feeling. Feeling is more objective than sensation; it far more energetically vibrates in sympathy with another, outside being. But feeling over the course of a lifetime also deepens its basis without losing its formal character. The more we become aware of universal coherence, the greater becomes its pull against our purely subjective position. This restraining reaction comes into being the moment the general significance of an objective power is realized. As I think abstractly and learn to see myself as a subordinate part of an indivisible whole, my feeling expands into emotion. Thus I am mentally affected by a personal injury or satisfaction to the extent that it can be

conceived as a weakening or strengthening of the universal harmony. The instinct for happiness discovers that the only magical secret of satisfaction is care for the general human welfare. Thus we rise from the simple love of self to a love of family and species (*race*) and from there to absolute altruism, philanthropy, and the noble sentiments of civic awareness.

It is the intimation of the good that enriches love. For this reason concepts such as value, power, and meaning no longer suffice to characterize the mental stimulus concerned. People now have an inner, "universally true" luminous power;² they are sanctified, ceremonial bearers of a public dignity. The friendly person now appears to me to be good and noble; the spiteful person is everywhere vicious and devilish. I feel myself in my own or in another's body but only as a worthy representative of the whole species.

This advance is actually nothing other than an intellectual renunciation and volatilization of the feeling of self, which now exists only in relation to the whole. Thus the kindred sensation [*Mitgefühlsweg*] and sympathy [*Mitgefühl*] that we might have, for instance, for a wounded soldier become a more profound emotional experience as we expand our transposed and sympathetic self into a general human self in such a way that the purity of all human existence appears sullied by this one image of suffering. The barbarity of enmity, the powerlessness of the individual, the whole sense of resignation—breathing his last amid the overwhelming tumult of life—all this is written on the soldier's face, and the whole of humanity must, so to speak, repeat it and relive it.

Yet mortality can also be regarded as a natural law that makes us at least as much aware of our own dependence as we are of the practical laws governing human conflicts.

When the farmer sees a storm devastate his crops or an avalanche crush his house, wife, and child, when adversity seizes upon his personal life with an inevitability and willfulness surpassing even the worst that his brother Cain can do, he may well come to believe that humanlike beings with superhuman strength are responsible for these events. These beings disturb and assail him, yet not everywhere and not always. Their moods vary, or else they fall into two categories. And so he seeks to prevail upon their presumed will, either by entreaties and submission or by threats. Primitive man knows nothing of real mechanical causes but only of a perpetrator or instigator; even today the charcoal burner swears at his fire if it does not burn properly. We can see the difficulty of thinking in terms of natural causes

²Vischer, *Kritische Gänge*, 155.

in the formation of myths. There is always something very disconcerting about a change. We find it hard to believe that the sun can appear on the left instead of on the right side. Naïve man accounts for such things by analogy to his own changeable behavior. He therefore assumes there is a person directing these things. Either this living agent resides within the objects as their secret life, or (since this metamorphosis of the individual into an object is somewhat difficult to imagine) he thinks of things as the works and instruments of a secret ruler. When the aboriginal inhabitants of a plain first came across a mountain, they may well have thought: this must have been made by someone bigger and stronger than any of us!

The individualization of nature is therefore directly or indirectly personal. The god either resides in the things or he has them in his power (thunderbolt, sun chariot). In the latter case, with the aid of other phenomena (especially clouds) we invent working, driving, primordial figures derived from the created world, figures who treat things as such simply as an appendage of themselves—very much as I feel a stick to be an extension of my arm and an increase of my power. This is a special sense of form [*Formgefühl*], which, like a foreign shoot grafted onto pure self-feeling, can be described as a continuation of it. Basically, it corresponds to the attitude that we have termed attentive feeling.³

Here in the mythical world we are, of course, not dealing merely with playful groping and attachment but with ideal, primeval intentions. The object with which a deity has been vested is henceforth regarded as an attribute and demonic instrument of an all-powerful spiritual force. In short, the natural emotions are filled with mythical content. Thus we cannot speak of a complete emotional relation with nature until the natural gods have been elevated to moral gods. As long as Wotan¹³ was merely the whirlwind, he lived only in the feelings of the Germans. Yet when he rose to the position of highest judge and protector of the people, he was revered with emotion and became an object of love. As long as the deity was still wedded to slimy nature, he retained the contingent, inarticulate, and obscurely menacing character of nature. Only after he had been cleansed of nature's mud and emerged as an independent figure did he attain the true dignity and beatitude of a god.

Once feeling has indulged in this alternate masking and unmasking of the human form, it now enters the third and final stage of the pure, free animation of form, as seen in that pantheistic cult of nature that we meet at every turn, in every spoken and written word, in every book that has been written, even in those that

³We must separate out the symbols that take the natural form as a veil, a dress, and the house of the god. This is a special case of free sympathy (expansive feeling).

deploy all the resources of human ingenuity to refute pantheism. Now there is no longer a need to insert a living, visible person into or alongside the natural phenomenon. This happens now in such a subtle and unconscious way that the transposed body is completely forgotten in favor of the soul transposed with it. Anything and everything has become vision and spirit; anything and everything is now measured by the standard of love and peaceful order, vicious rage, and malicious destruction ("for the elements hate the creations of man"). And even though the playfulness of the imagination can never completely be contained and will always secretly suggest the organic forms and movements of its own body, these remain a "free appearance" of the imagination. Thus natural reality always retains its objective form.

The poet sings of the breezes of spring as his brothers, sings of blessed isles, of the "enraptured" night, of "Father Aether." The individual phenomena of space are at the same time brought into a tragic relationship with each other, analogous to that felt by the laws of nature. A spirit of transience seems to settle over every creation of form, like a melancholy dew. The tree bends and shakes its head like a weary human being. The "time-worn" rock marvels at the changing air, as the "rejuvenating light" of the "eternal sun" streams "over the aged giant, and ivy sprouts green around him."

A stricter emphasis on the purely aesthetic approach would thus find a spiritual, instinctive, ideal intensification of the end in itself, which previously held only a purely sensuous value in the perception and imagination. In negative terms, it would of course be necessary to exclude the mental stimulus related to the substance of the object, just as we previously excluded the physical stimulus. I feel in order to feel; the object is only appearance and is simply there for play. I feel in order to enjoy the universal in me or in the world, and this imagined perfection of the universe easily bears me beyond the faltering and difficult fate of the individual. Likewise, the extent of formal gratification no longer rests on a merely physical but also on an intellectual and immanent likeness. The self-created, innate, primal image is now imbued with the criterion of a harmonious idea. In short, the ideality of imagination has emerged.

THE IMAGINING WILL

I have already pointed to the difference between the purely aesthetic attitude and the pathological attitude of an intentional act of will (desire and intention). This distinction is well known and is based on Kant's tenet that taste is the ability to make a judgment of pleasure without self-interest in the existence of the object.

Yet it cannot be denied that desires and acts of will do to some extent occur, even here in the realm of the imagination.* As we shall see, it is actually an act of will that bridges the gap between imagination and art.

Initially the will always seeks to satisfy a need for pleasure. Thus the will, whether imagined or real, essentially aims toward an act or an actual reaction. This does not happen when we enjoy a "free appearance." When the will wants to or does intervene, it destroys the free appearance.

My vital will is also struck and stimulated by every aesthetic phenomenon, but only figuratively, and thus it remains calm within. All serious and demanding acts of the will obstruct the pure imagining feeling as they strive, now for an attractive material possession, now for an abstract purpose. In the latter case, the will can in turn pursue (indirectly) a material possession or (directly) a purely intellectual good.

We have referred to a certain sentient tranquility that occupies the sense and spirit of the whole person, his whole humanity. This is a concern for a universal significance that the individual object in itself lacks but that we inwardly attribute to it. This would be impossible if an actual or willful attraction were to take place. The material object and the material fascination with its forms, which was very much an original premise for any sense of form, is forgotten once the universal, total, and selfless force of emotion pervades it.

We are dealing with an intellectualization, with a humanization of spatial bodies, which—in the state of completeness that we demand—is possible only from a distance and in the imagination. Once I become involved with the execution of my will, I encounter the problem and poverty of isolation, and I must extract perfection from an endless array of individual expressions of the will. I have no use for the disturbance that arises from every direct encounter through the inevitable assertion of the absolute otherness or foreignness of an object. I want a free, unimpeded visualization of the appearance of individual completeness. A real, that is, imperfect individuality can accord with neither myself nor the whole; such an individuality therefore has an isolating effect. Thus reaction ultimately destroys all feeling. Desire is dull. I either consume the individuality or discard it apprehensively. It is only an instrumental means to satisfy a partial purpose. I can neither detest nor covet the whole, and therefore there is no need for an active reaction to it. It remains neutral and invulnerable. We can do nothing about it other than remain lovingly content with it.

*Aristotle's *politikos* is "active leisure" (*thalgos Mesis*). See Köstlin, *Aesthetik*, 18; and Vischer, *Kritische Gänge*, 150, "disinterested interest" (*Interesse ohne Interesse*).

Yet there is also a will within the image. We speak of a friendly and well-behaved or of a jarring and rude relation of the forms to one another, and we mentally participate in that relation. This participation can be volitional (active empathy, responsive feeling) as well as emotional. We are also aware—indeed are continually reminded of the fact—that universal harmony balances all one-sided forces and that the image is only an appearance. We therefore distinguish between the relation of the eye to the object and the relation of the object's parts to one another. By keeping in mind in the latter case the universal harmony, or rather, the image of our own perfection, we find much to clarify in the details of the image presented by nature. We intensify the expression of its striving, we enhance the positive and lessen the negative force. This occurs out of immanent mental necessity. It is decidedly an act of will, but it is completely unpathological in nature: we disturb no fiber, no breath of reality. We simply organize and intensify the essential and weaken the inessential in order to safeguard the whole and prevent any unfree reaction (within and toward the object).

We are at the same time pleased and stimulated by our relation to our fellow human beings: the free, practical drive to understand our own species. The reaction of the will now directs itself toward our fellow human beings in order to communicate the emotional value of the impression. Only by means of this visible, real reproduction is a truly clear purification and clarification of the natural model achieved.

I want to show and replicate for my fellow human beings what goes on inside me, what my imagining will [*Vorstellungswille*] is doing in the object. The actual reaction of the imagining will [*Phantasiewille*] is therefore based on imitation.

What does imitation mean if it is not simple mimicry of a living form or action? The kind of imitation that concerns us here is congruous neither with the genesis of the object of sensation nor with its developed, existing form. It is essential in this context that the forms of the object always be repeated with the subject's other forms and means. This process, so difficult to disentangle, has to deal first then with the resistance of our own will toward the object's will. The impulse tends to maintain the independence of its organic self-being and yet somehow attach itself to an Other. The conscious movements accompanying the stimulus are basically already imitations, or better said, mediations between subject and object. We are of course not concerned here with totally negative or intractable stimuli, mood changes, and disturbances appearing as apprehensions.

These ostensible imitations of what is perceived can be divided conveniently into categories of immediate feeling, responsive feeling, and empathetic feeling.

Originally, music and language were based on the imitative expression of an impression, which forms the basis for the art of mimicry and its rigid reflec-

tion—physiognomy. It is particularly evident in our gestures, which always take the form of an arbitrary replication of our impressions (arbitrary because obscured by the reproduction of our own bodies). To suggest something undervalued or magnificent, for instance, we open our arms wide; to indicate greatness and majesty, we raise them high; to show something contemplated, doubtful, or untrue, we shake our head and hands.

Our internal vacillation and struggle thus express themselves externally in analogous movements of our muscles and limbs. Every sensitive person is in this way guided by impressions, and it is the hand in particular—that most noble medium of practical instinct—that is magnetically swept along with such movement, whereby the interlocutor receives a rough description of what is represented. Nothing is more natural, then, than that this hand that traces designs in the air should also seek to set down its images in a more permanent presentation with a solid material. The imitation, however, has to come to terms with the limits of the material used. But even this artistic imitation, no matter how unskillful it may be, has its origin in the adequate product of an inner, dynamically emulating process. The eye has initiated a process that travels through the entire nervous system, the entire soul, the entire person. It is the hidden end purpose of all naive forms to portray this process [*Nachleben*]; it is self-delusion to suppose that creation concerns itself simply with a model found in nature. Thus, to a certain extent, in every lively imitation we see the genesis of the imagining will aroused by the object in such a way that even in the presentation is the artist's individual manner made apparent.

Inasmuch as the artist has not a mannered but an intellectually sound and sensuously purified individuality, supported by a general zest for life, he will certainly have nothing to do with slavish imitation. By transposing the intuitive and rational human norm to the object, he will describe in everything the perfect human being, in everything his own facial expression as it is transfigured in the illusionary splendor of the world. He harmonizes the phenomenon so that in his hand it grows into a complete expression of the felt human harmony and divinity of the universe.

Only in the artistic reaction is the private character—the subjectivity—of imagination truly overcome; for now the image has been changed into the shared, universally valued human possession. The blurred, embryonic creations of the imagination have thus come of age.

THE ARTIST

Considered purely subjectively and as a result of the above-discussed components, imagination is based on an honest union and a warm mutual feeling between the

senses and the soul in which both appear as one. Thus we are tempted to speak of a soulful eye or an eyelike soul. Both, in fact, were originally one, but in the course of its development the intellect placed itself in opposition to the senses, and only the artist succeeds in achieving their reunion. A pantheistic urge toward perfect form already exists in sensuous, unconscious life, yet it can be roused and be seen only in instances in which the soul, convinced and inspired by the ideal of perfection, lets itself be entirely absorbed in its own sensuousness. The reciprocal relationship between the senses and the soul is therefore an absolute one: it leaves neither a sensory nor an abstract remainder.

The singular gift of the artist for a collective assimilation of his material rests on this inner totality. The purely sensuous or the purely abstract consciousness achieves unity only very slowly, however hard one tries, for it must lift up and examine every stone upon which it wishes to step. If urgency is needed, reflection might cause us to despair of taking a leap. The artistic imagination, on the other hand, is always poised to spring, it proceeds unconsciously with mystical spurts of concentration.* It implies the parts of the whole, but only after it has conjured up the basic outlines does it make use of the meticulous advice of circumspection.

Apart from the "how" of his achievement, the artist owes this totality, or quiet unity within himself generally, to the pleasure of pure observation. He opens his eyes; this is his most striking habit. Contrary to the apathetic individual, who is always unable to detach himself from the elements of his environment, the artist lives in a state of amazement, as trusting as it is reserved. Because he keeps his eyes open, he is constantly surprised. Things are astonishingly objective to him. He does not look at them in the way a citizen does who goes to a town meeting and joins in the talk but like a silent, solitary stranger who has set out to spy the world—the whole world—as his desired alter ego. Therefore he does not have time to lose himself in details. He issues from the world spirit, and from that vantage point at the center of everything, he looks out, smiling, upon life's proclaimed values. He is at liberty to do whatever he wants; he does not have to defend himself against anyone; everything is new to him. He never ceases to wonder at the individuality of his own worldly offspring: how each lives its own special life and yet remains immortal.

Art is as much an intensification of sensuousness as a higher form of natural physics. It is as much purely subjective as it is purely objective. It delivers a universally valid product and knows how to translate the indefinability and instability of mental life, as well as the chaotic disorder of nature, into a magnificent objectivity.

*It resembles the actual promotion, which always contains an obscure number of conclusions.

into a clear reflection of a free humanity. Its image is simple form and content; it is a clear spring whose bottom can be seen, a pure breath of mountain air high above the haze of the plain.

It is truly the essence of artistic ideality not to be conceptually aware of itself but to mirror itself in an individual object. Far from obscuring the object's special character it simply forces the impulse of form to take those characteristics as its personal idea and to model itself on them. To this end it harmonizes the object, not from an abstract, universal canon but from a subjective, concrete principle that is part of the human psychophysical self.

Thus every work of art reveals itself to us as a person harmoniously feeling himself into a kindred object, or as humanity objectifying itself in harmonious forms.

ARTISTIC RESHAPING

Pure Form and Stylization

We have seen how pure form may appear meaningful and soulful to us. We are accustomed to regarding inorganic nature as pure form, and we can even reduce organic form to a completely formal concept. This whole approach can be termed a symbolism of form, which for us means a harmonious symbolism of form. The simple act of imputing emotional content must therefore be expanded into a reshaping of natural forms—both the composition and its details—that are always found wanting.

First an overall plan arises within us. At a glance, the immediate feeling produces a total image in which light and physical masses are brought into a rough balance and in which the individual parts or secondary forms are made subordinate to the basic or main forms.

Pressed by the need to refine the form's spirit and to safeguard elementary vital feelings against the trivial, art always aims to liberate and accentuate the essential and dominant aspect of the phenomenon. Yet this is truly successful only if the whole inner image of nature is formed and represented. Harmonization evolves with stylization. We therefore have a close counterpart to the inner approach of scanning and responsive feeling, except that here the object not only evolves and becomes better defined over time but is actually realized. The harmonious ensemble is to such an extent elevated into a rhythmic motion, and even though the artist with his finishing touches returns it to its original state of simultaneity, the motion can still be felt. The lawful order and division of the whole appear at the same time as the pure and spontaneous sweep of the brush or chisel, which has its natu-

ral points of repose and which alternates in its movements between repetition and change. Since we now have a created picture of nature, we can speak of a symbolism of the presentation (in the stormy character and the rushing energy of Rubens's technique, for example) as readily as we speak of a symbolism of the pure (natural) form.

On this rests the specific nature of artistic, that is, of technical interest. In the formal symbolism of nature, the subjective, physical intention was emancipated from all true objectivity; here, too, we disregard all objective content and grasp the image purely through its external appearance.

Since representation is an activity carried out over time, it is not only analogous to responsive feeling but identical with it. Yet because it is external, the sensuous premise, the tactile element, and the responsive sensation are again emphasized. Just as they were previously the occasion and leading cause of feeling, so they are once again its means of expression.

Like the subjective observer engaged in responsive feeling, the artist always works from the outside in. This internalizing process may at the same time relate either to the viewer's imagination or objectively to a represented, apparent, or real individual content (attentive feeling for the purpose of empathetic feeling). The artist, however, can reshape such content only internally (as with the composition derived from immediate feeling), that is, in advance of his representation of it. The way in which he represents it will always have a stylistic and subjective value of its own.

Certainly there is a purely mechanical process of creation by soulless, insensitive artists (routine, mere show; cf. photography), yet frequently even the technical activity of a genuine artist is described as craftsmanlike in its approach—that is, as an aesthetic exercise performed without feeling and focused solely on the value of the represented object. I do not understand this scorn for the artist's own direct means of artistic expression. Through it, the artist reveals his character; he does so, furthermore, in a manner that is evoked by the sensation of the object. And so there is by no means a lack of content or "idea."

*The Unconscious Force of Organic Form and Its Artistic Intensification (Organization)*¹⁷ Stylization realizes not only the immediately felt, general plan of the composition but also the empathized, stereometric concrete form. Only thus will it achieve the

¹⁷If in its customary usage it did not imply an external ordering and arranging, the term "organization" would be much preferred because of the clear analogy of form with the terms "stylization" and "idealization."

level of intensification demanded by the physical form to which it aspires.

Yet when our projection of feeling encounters the organic content of the object, we have to ask first whether this content is unconscious (bodily, plant-like) or conscious (mental) and second whether it can be perceived as conscious or unconscious.

An object that does not signify life to us so much as possess a life of its own appears expressive to us, even when it is unconscious. Art, however, is not content with expressive physical form, for that is always more or less concealed and limited. It strives to extract the "vaporicity for life," the "vital foundation."¹⁸ The organic intention must emerge and discharge themselves. The lax relationship of the parts must be made more stringent; the independence of this undisciplined and incomplete existence must be forced back into a bodily center; everything superfluous that swells out beyond the natural limits must be tempered or eradicated. There is a "quiet pathos of being,"¹⁹ a silent mysticism of the simple, breathing body and life that can lead the true artist to the highest ecstasy. One need only consider the studies of a Raphael or a Dürer; many of them speak simply through this organic purity and through its astonishing effect (the torso of Hercules, the charms of a fragmentary limb, an arm or a leg).

In this context we think first of all of the representation of vegetable forms, then in a certain sense of animal and human images. Where the image is human, the merging of (my) subjective feeling with the object is an obscure and dreamlike process (the Barberini Faun²⁰). The human soul is only dimly prefigured—just as in all sensation there is a latent tendency toward spiritualization and toward feelings. We might call this a degradation of human existence; yet in this sensuous still life there resides such an infinity of mental disposition and preparation that the most ideal emotions of the soul present themselves as if spontaneously. With antique statuary in particular, we often feel as if we were looking upon the first human beings at the moment when the Lord created them—still moist with nonbeing, unacquainted with life, yet obscurely touched by memory as if everything had already been felt and experienced.

The principle of this organic intensification of life is always the truth of reality, whether it aims for an archetypical or an individual effect. It always selects the positive core as its starting point; it always radiates the living warmth of a dynamic existence. The inner life finds a pure manifestation in the outer life, for both are apprehended through the senses.

¹⁸Manasse Ungler, *Das Wesen der Malerei* (Leipzig: H. Schulze, 1851), 130, 131.

¹⁹Scherner, *Das Leben der Traume*, II.

The basic character of such intensification is repose: its only concern is with the involuntary mode of filling space and with the immanent potential of the constant state. Indeed, motion itself can be aesthetically conceived simply as a filling of space that is strictly bound by the interplay of forces with the body and thus as an organic, harmonious force. Yet we should also bear in mind that we are concerned here with the figure as such, quite irrespective of any exterior change. Through motion, the individual forms and forces emerge in isolation and point distractingly to an exterior purpose—something other than the work itself. There is no worse enemy to the activity that we like to call organization—to the desired representation of a sensory, concrete, independent vital harmony—than the squint-eyed, distracting stimulus.

Idealization and the Conscious Idea of Form

Through the idea everything expresses a specific spiritual life. The world of sense, then, is only a window on spiritual content that strikes us all the more compellingly the more it accords with our concept and our ideal of perfection.

I need not reiterate that the inorganic and unconsciously organic phenomenon (a plant) becomes a symbolic intimation of the harmony of the soul.

For the sake of completeness I must briefly speak of the animal and human forms, the sight of which produces an immediate spiritual empathy, one that coincides with the (objectively) spiritual purpose of that form itself. It is then that we realize the full power of the indwelling spirit, both outwardly through stylization and inwardly through the intensification of the sensuous force (organization). The concentration and union of the parts become a spiritual absorption of them. Everything appears as definite expression and dominant presence of the idea (look, *mien*). Through this spiritual awakening and refinement of organic substance, forms acquire an infinite, spiritual background and an appearance of intimacy and bliss. Our heart is directly touched. Only now do we stand before naked beauty. Whereas before, in blindly following a disguised idea, we supposed ourselves to perceive only form and shape, now we believe that we have only an idea; we almost forget what we owe to its surrogate, the form.

The artist undertakes to emancipate this idea that is trapped in real life and to shape it flawlessly. He can achieve this by either a "direct" or an "indirect idealization." In the first case he simply makes a beautiful form, a deity or an archetype of the species (that is, he realizes what seems to him the ideal, without any and all consideration). In the second case he is more interested in an energetic individualization of it; he will make beauty incomplete in order to set off the idea by a vivid and vengeful contrast, as in a palimpsest, we then believe we can make out beneath

the superimposed letters the powerful hand of the original. We call such an image characteristic. We can also call it Socratic: in the profound sense of a Socratic dialogue, the beauty—the divine image—is cloaked in the hide of an unruly satyr (see Plato's *επιμύθιον* [*Symposium*]).

Both cases—direct and indirect idealization—can in turn be treated in two ways: either in terms of feeling, as in the representation of an ideal force and power (the Farnese *Hercules*²⁷), or in terms of emotion, as in the presentation of an ideal goodness and excellence (Christ, Luther, "the beauty of the soul").

Thus far we have spoken only of the individual figure and observed how (without any outward signs and attributes) it reflects upon its idea (Dürer's *Four Apostles*²⁸). But art finds its highest goal in depicting a moving conflict of forces. Although the poet is certainly justified in naming this purpose his true calling, it has always been and remains a courageous task for the visual arts, for in all situations of action and speech the spiritual aspect predominates to such an extent that art may easily abandon its most characteristic sphere and renounce its true existence—the world of pure contemplation and physical presence. In addition to a strong preference for conceptual and material effects, German painters have always had an awkward yet seemingly salutary dislike of depicting highly animated, stirring scenes. The Latin countries, on the contrary, have achieved remarkable things in this field, although we also know of the excesses to which renunciation of specific formal identity has led them—the whirl of the Baroque and the fireworks of the showmen.

The visual artist should enjoy motion for its own sake, completely apart from its motive. Motion is always the form of the relation between the forms that compose individual bodies. If these bodies are also those of conscious individuals, then an abstract concept, a reflective tension, is introduced into the expressiveness of the motion, namely, the notion of cause and effect. Yet the moment I concern myself with this, I find that the purely objective effect of the image is disturbed. I relate to the object in a half-poetic way; that is, I see spirits scurrying around the visible figures, which can easily begin to look to me like letters—letters that allow me to read the truth between the lines. The artist must know how to concentrate this poetic abstraction for the eye and for the feeling in the moving figure so that whatever it does explicitly is also implicit in its form and so that the microcosm remains intact. On the other hand, the multiplicity of phenomena must flow harmoniously into an individual whole that can both contain and reconcile its own inner, changing relationships.

These changing relationships may be purely a matter of feeling or purely a matter of will. We want to have represented the energy of a living act, whether it be the specific act of one individual or of a society, of a community, and so on,

or whether it be in historical or mythical deeds. A poetic effect in the best sense occurs when it is combined with reconciliation on the level of higher emotion or when the forms have been touched by the consecration of loving kindness and human sentiment.

Source Note: Robert Vischer, *Über das optische Formgefühl: Ein Beitrag zur Aesthetik* (Leipzig: Hermann Gredner, 1873).

Translator's Notes

1. The quotation is the last line in Eduard Mörike's poem "Auf eine Lampe."
2. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Kritik meiner Aesthetik," in *idem, Kritische Gänge* (Stuttgart: Coeta, 1866), 5: 140: "Wir werden annehmen dürfen, daß jeder geistige Art in bestimmten Sehensformen—and nur weiß weichen!—Modifikationen des Nerven sich in der Art vollzieht und zugleich reflektiert, daß diese sein Bild darstellen, daß also ein symbolisches Abbilden schon im vorweggenannten Innern des Organismus statt findet: die äußeren Erscheinungen, welche so eigenhändig auf uns wirken, daß wir ihnen unwillkürlich Seheinstimmungen unterlegen, setzen sich zu diesem Innern Abbild verhalten wie seine objektive Darstellung und Auswanderlegung: der vorausgesetzte Neigung des Nerven zu den betreffenden Sehensformen kommt das entsprechende Naturphänomen entgegen, wirkt sie zur Action, stärkt und beunruhigt sie und hiermit die in ihr sich spiegelnde Sehebewegung."
3. *Ibid.*, 144–45: "Die verschiedenen Dimensionen der Linie und Fläche, die Ueberschiebe ihrer Bewegung... wirken sinnlich: das Sehvermögen erhebt, das Hörgewisse erweitert, die Geschmackswirksamkeit lebhafter als das Geruchs, gemindert an Ausdehnung und Einlenkung der inneren Lebens von und zu gegebenen Punkten und Gesetzen."
4. Karl Köstlin, *Aesthetik* (Tübingen: H. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1869), 322: "... Auch Ausdrücken an die Vorstellung indirekt symbolisch nachgebildet..."
5. *Ibid.*, 324: "... schon Eine Form an eine andre erinnert, Symbol einer andern Formgestaltung sein kann, so Körpergröße Symbol geistiger Größe, Bedeutsamkeit, Kraft..."
6. Köstlin (see note 4), 324: "Alle quantitativen Formbeschaffenheiten erinnern an die ihnen entsprechenden qualitativen, alle sinnlichen an die ihnen entsprechenden geistigen Formbeschaffenheiten..."
7. Köstlin (see note 4), 325: "Wie der menschliche Geist lebendig genug ist, um durch Ähnlichkeit an Ähnliches erinnert zu werden, so ist er auch stark genug mit sich selber beschäftigt, auf sich selber gerichtet, sein selber sich beunruhigt, um namentlich Ähnlichkeiten äußere Dinge mit seinen eigenen Zuständen, [Verhältnissen], Erlebnissen, Empfindungen, Stimmungen, Affekten, Leidenschaften überhaupt wahrzunehmen, in Allem sich ein Gegenbild von sich, ein Symbol des Menschlichen wiederzufinden."
8. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Kritik meiner Aesthetik," in *Kritische Gänge* (see note 2), 142: "... Geheimeiß, das die Psychologie im Bande mit der Physiologie aufzuklären hilft."
9. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Kritik meiner Aesthetik," in *Kritische Gänge* (see note 2), 142–43: "... auchwahrnehmliches Dunkel, in welcher jene Punkte gehüllt sind, wie Seele und Nerven-

centium Eins sind." (The language used is not a direct quote from Friedrich Theodor Vischer, but rather a paraphrase.—Ed.)

10. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Kritik meiner Aesthetik," in *Kritische Gänge* (see note 2), 146: "... unmöglich ist, aus unseren gewöhnlichen Beobachtungen in diesem dunklen Gebiete jenseit ein System aufzubauen."

11. Gustav Adolph Lindner, *Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie als induktive Wissenschaft*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Gröschl, 1872), 53, 56: ein "derfern Schauen in die unmittelbare Nähe" and ein "wärentz Testen in die Ferns."

12. Wilhelm Wundt, *Vorlesungen über Menschen- und Thierpsychik* (Leipzig: L. Voss, 1862), 2. Lecture, 35, 80: "Wo die Auge frei sich bewegen kann, da verläßt es seinen physiologischen Mechanismus gewöhnlich in vertikaler und horizontaler Richtung jenseit der geraden Linie, jede schräge Richtung aber legt es in einer Bogenlinie zurück."

13. Heinrich Wölfflin quotes the same passage from Wundt in his essay in this volume, p. 150. Adolf Göller also alludes to this passage in his essay, p. 200.

14. Heinrich Wölfflin quotes this passage from Vischer in his essay in the present volume, although he may have gathered it from his reading of Johannes Volkelt, *Der Symbol-Begriff in der modernen Aesthetik* (Jena: Hermann Dufft, 1876), 60.

15. A Teutonic deity identified with Woden, or Odin, king of gods and men. As a warrior he holds court in Valhalla surrounded by the heroes who have fallen in battle.

16. The Barberini Faun (Munich, Glyptothek) is a large Greek marble statue of a sleeping satyr from about 220 B.C., which was found in the seventeenth century during excavations of the emperor Hadrian's tomb in Rome. The satyr is portrayed leaning against a rock in a dreamlike pose that conveys both the supernatural and the natural being. The realism of the statue has been praised for its ability to make the observer "hear his deep breathing and see how the wine makes his veins swell and his agitated pulse beat."

17. Farnese Hercules (Naples, Museo Nazionale, no. 6001) is a Roman marble copy of a fourth-century B.C. statue by the Greek sculptor Lysippos, who depicts the aging hero resting against his club, his musculature in stark contrast to his inner weariness. The portrayal stresses humanization and suffering rather than heroism.

18. Albrecht Dürer, *Four Apostles (Die Apostel)*, 1526 (Munich, Alte Pinakothek, nos. 545 and 546). The diptych has long been interpreted as representing the four temperaments and hence as implying that all of humanity can participate in the redemption. Painted without a commission and donated by Dürer to his natal city, Nuremberg, the diptych is also a strong supporter of the Reformation, for the texts at the bottom that describe each of the four apostles are quoted from Luther's translation of 1522 of the New Testament.