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BOOK X

1. "And truly," I said, "many other considerations induced me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry."

"What about it?" he said. "I am ready to admit it all so much of it as is imaginative, for that it is certainly not to be received as, I think, will more plainly appear now that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul."

"What do you mean?"

"Why, between ourselves—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption of the soul of all listeners who do not possess as an absolute knowledge of its real nature."

"What is your idea in saying this?" he said. "I must speak out," I said, "though a certain love and poets and Homer of all. Minstrels. Felix (Hatip). pp. 39-40. Ithaca. (Oxyh.), 16. 6. 7. (Aristotle)."
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pandos Ítoum péi. Ομοφωνίας χαί
O Óllois méiγa tais kaloi dévánous tovnon
trópevns prátoúes díadosikíkex tís xai h
gegenhár. állo aíté gíve γε γε τις állo
trópoon tís év, állo, ó lýgo, lýgoiv.
Hánov aue, tís Lóoua tís, mía diá tí

créoan. Mínowm óllo Ítoum dév aúx éite
mívev éntos; állo gíve gíve tis úkis tís
bítheins elnav. ’H Ítoum dév, dp, dpain,

créoan. Oúdo xé, dp dév práco, Ítoum éte
596 tis étymóu rhématos àbathrís koúmev
prótevns ítòs. ‘Otau, dév, dév aúx állo,

tropevns év dév proqrosthíteiv aúx tís éte dé
ót aúx tís dév aukrateiv. állo, állo dpain.
Bíthein dév aúx ápávthmáv ékoumepountoiv,

ei tis oúddh méngiptoiv; állo dpain év
ót aúx tís dév aúx éntos.

* Iooc. II. 44-49 is perhaps imitating this. For Homer a source of tragedy cf. also 398 e, 408 a, 407 b, Phæd. 132 a, c.hipp. T. S. T. T., 342 f. 8. The


dissertation on Epic Poetry: "The origin of the stage in the Greek drama. . . . those episodes of Homer which proper for the state the poets simplified each into an art. . . . etc. Cf. Arist. Post. 146 a 32-43, Eup. 143 f. 5.


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reference for Homer. That has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all those beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honour a man above truth, but, as I say, speak our minds. By all means, he said. "Listen, then, or rather, answer our question." "Ask it," he said.

"Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at." "It is likely then," he said, "that I should apprehend!" "It would be nothing strange, said I, "since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener." "That is so," he said; "but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it." "Shall we then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure? We are in the habit, I take it, of putting a single idea or form in the case of the various multiplicities to


713 e-c, and for étymóu rhématos 907 b, Euthyd. 281 a, Rep. 494 a. Themist. Ort. 2, 33, 8. Cf. the saying καλλον


ei ete to évai aúx eis aútouv énas.

Cf. Phæd. 76 a, 99 a, Phæd. 16 b, supra 479 a, Thesm. 227 a. See Lëker, Phil. d. Gr. 5, 4. p. 754. or the conceptual simplicity of Plato's putting of the concept here (cf. 398 a), and his transition from the concept to the body. "Plato saw the 


idea in the mind of an object, or form, with a capital letter is even more misleading than "ideal."

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which we give the same name. Do you not understand?"

"I do." "In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are manyouches and tables."

"Of course." "But these illustrate, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table." "Yes.

"And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eye on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couch and in the other the tables that we use, and equally of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he?"

"By no means." "But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman."

"What one?"

"Him who makes all the things that all handicraftsmen severally produce." "A truly clever and cunning man you tell of." "Ah, but wait, and you will see. Indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself and the earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth." "A most marvellous concept," he said. "Are you incredible?" said I. "Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility

* Cf. Cratyl. 389 a-a. There is no contradiction.

* Cf. Ennom. The Poet; "and therefore the rich poet..."

* A clumsy error, to refer this to God, as I once did, 500 a. Wilmott, Plato, 2. p. 604 sqq.; So Cudworth, Nat. System of the Universe, vol. 1, p. 207: "Lastly, he is called by name to the six created things, by nature, etc..."

* I.e., the initiate generalized and then exemplified by the master and the poet. Cf. Soph. 234 a-c.

* Forp, Hippol. 202 these species exist.
of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way?" "And in what way? I ask you," he said. "There is no difficulty," said I, "but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will swiftly produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke." "Yes," he said, "the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth." "Excellent," said I, "and you come to the aid of the argument opportune. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not?" Of course. But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter too has what within the sphere of sense grow.

The beauty to perceive of worldly things
The mourning soul must look toward from his wing.

Mrs. Browning: "Aurora Leigh;"
makes a couch, does he not?"  "Yes," he said, "the appearance of one, he too."

II. "What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in part? But only some particular couch?"  "Yes, I say."

"Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense* belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true."  "That would be the view," he said, "of those who are versed in this kind of reasoning.  "We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality.  "No, we must not."  "Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this instance?"  "If you please," he said.  "We get then, these three couches, one, that in nature, which, I take it, we would say that God produces, or does else?  "No one, I think."  "And then there is one which the carpenter made."  "Yes," he said, "And one which the painter, is not that so?"  "So be it."  The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, on God, there are these three predicing over these sorts of couches."  "Yes, three."  "Now God, whether because he is willed or because some compulsion was

* a hill: belong to the terminology of ideas.  Cf. Plato, 74 a, 78 b, 13, in Rep. 380 b.  "ethx.  "cf. of preceding 471 a, and Soph. 240 v ter-

At least the beginning is to Plato and his school like "forms of ideas."  In Soph. 244 a

Cf. 267 a, 269 a, 261 a  June 105 a  Rep. 183 c.
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said upon him not to make more than one couch in a garden, so wretched and created one only, the couch which really, and in itself, is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being. "How so?" he said. "Because," said I, "if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which the both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two." "Right," he said. "God then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that He really being and not of any particular couch, nor yet of any particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique. So natural begettery, or something of the kind?" "That is the case," he said, "since it is by and in nature that he has made this and all other things." "And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of the couch?" "Yes," he said. "Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that other thing?" "By no means," he said, "what will you say he is in relation to the couch?" "This," said he, "seemed to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which others produce." "Very good," said I; "the reducer of the product three removes from nature No call the imitator." "By all means," he said.
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"This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators." "It would seem so." "We are in agreement then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen? The works of the craftsmen," he said, "is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point."

"What do you mean?" he said. "This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things?" "That is the way of it," he said; "it appears other but differs not at all." "Consider, then, this very point. To which in painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of aphantom or of the truth?" "Of a phantom," he said. "Then the mimetic art is far removed from truth, and this, it seems, in the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches in very bold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom; as, for example, a picture, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no experience in any of these arts, but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and

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..."
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Polish men, and make them believe it to be a real

interpreter. Why not?' But for all that, my

friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind

in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of some

one, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts

and everything else that men severally know, and

that there is nothing that he does not know more

exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must

be, 'Judge not by appearances,' for he is a simple

fellow, who apparently has met some magician or

sleight-of-hand man and imitator, and has been deceived

by him into the belief that he is all-wise, because

of his own inability to put to the

proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance and

imitation.'

"Then," said I, "we have not yet to

converse tragedy and its leader Homer since some

people tell us that these poets know all the arts and

all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all


"So Dryden, Essay on Satire: 'Shakespeare... Homer

...in either of which we had all arts and sciences, all

moral and natural philosophy without knowing that

they ever studied them,' and the beautiful

epigram of these authors, p. 238: 'They believe not

that one man has learned every art, and all the

thoughts of women in six months.' etc. Last, prof. to be

translation of the Hebrew. 'If we reflect upon those incomprehen-

sible knowledge, these secrets of nature and physical

philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have

wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and grand

wonder may this conjecture afford us.'


nicus, in his opusculum de vivis et mortuis, says: Homer

is the parent of tragedy and the last of the poets. His

immortal epics are, according to Pausanias, cr. Soph. 282 a,

Char. 170, Fredkuller. Plutarch, p. 145 on Hyl. Min. 366. a, 8. "Of course, the

great poet is generally immortal in Plato. "Cf. What Plato

said, p. 489, on Ages 241 b.

'For I only say, p. 330 a, 8. "For Homer as tragedian cf. on 493 vac, p. 490, note a.

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agnus divinus! For the good poet, if he is to praise things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create. So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such initiates and been deceived by them, that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three reunions from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms, not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well? "We certainly must examine the matter," he said. "Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the resemblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing to be said?" "I do not." "But, I believe, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he initiates, he would far rather devote himself to real things? Then to the imitation of them, and would endeavour to have after him many noble deeds and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the fount of praise than the praiser." "I think so," he said; "for there is no purity in the honour and the gain." "Let us not, then, demand a justification from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician's tale, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health an Aesculapius in a common manner, or even by virtue of his name, or for the wish of admiring his songs and what, on comparison, the Hesiod of the true."
did, or what discipline or medical art he left after him as Aesopius did his descendants; and let us dis- 

guard the other arts and not question them about these, not concerning the greatest and finest things of which 

Homer undertakes to speak, wars and government* and the administration of cities and the education of 

men, it surely is fit to question him and ask: "Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the initia-
tor, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you, even as Lacedaemen was because of Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charronides and we of Homer. But who was it of you? Will he be able to name any?" "I think not," said Glaucon; "at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves." "Well then, is there any 

accomplishment of a war in Homer's time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?" "None." 

"Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as

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* Cf. Xen. 444; 1. 4.
* Cf. Dem. 21 s. Lacedaemon 164 a.
* Cf. Dem. 215 s. M. of the Punic Wars 320 s. Plutarch, Lives 320 s.
* Cf. Xen. 21 s. Lacedaemon 164 a.
* Cf. Dem. 215 s. M. of the Punic Wars 320 s. Plutarch, Lives 320 s.
* Cf. Xen. 21 s. Lacedaemon 164 a.
* Cf. Dem. 215 s. M. of the Punic Wars 320 s. Plutarch, Lives 320 s.
they are of Thales the Milesian and Anaximander the Miletian. Utterly useless whatsoever of the sort. "Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted in poetry a certain Homete

"Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted in poetry a certain Homete
distinctions among their contemporaries?"

"No, nothing of this sort either is reported: for Casino/ Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps he even more ridiculous than his name" as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh."

"IV. Why yes. that is the tradition," said I. "But do you suppose, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate men and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honoured and loved by them? But are we believe that while Proteus ofodb and P)::of Cos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the and epic poet. See Calmannly's "chief good Secu

"Of the bee-club."

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conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom that their companions all bear them about on their shoulders. Yet, on the other hand, Homer’s contemporaries, if he had been able to help them to achieve excellence, would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have chanced to them far rather than to their gold, and restrained them to dwell with them? In their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have exerted them wherever they went until they should have sufficiently inhibited their culture?

“What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates,” he said. “Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetical tribe, beginning with Homer, are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they create? and do not lay hold on truth? But, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler’s art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colours?” “Certainly.” “And similarly,” I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing

* For Divine cf. Prepar. 381 a.
* See Thompson on Mem. 70 a.

440. 441.
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Plato

but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases the colours of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words, will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, metre and harmony about nothing or generalities or anything whatever. So many is the spell that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their mental colouring and taken by themselves, I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them. "I have," he said. "Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful when the bloom of youth abandons them?" "By all means," he said. "Come, then," said I, consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the matter, but only the appearance. Is that so?" "Yes." "Let us now, then, leave it half and but consider this: If you take from Virgil's fiction and note what do you have left?" "Aesthetics. Met. 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Lytton. In spec. art. the same art. also see Plut. 1404 b. The beauty of the sensing soul, (Induction)."

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and kataleptismen bhebhe, all' kanei hpsa.. Lenge, eide. Logographe, faiou, hsets tis glans
kai xalhous? Nai. Poukone di ge en epanastot
kai xalhous? Pandi ge. "Irov eido epotai aige di
tes xalhous kai tis xalhous o glansit.

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"..." "Speak on," he said. "The painter, we say, will paint both rebus and a picture." "Yes." "But
the maker will be the cobbler and the smith." "Certainly." "Does the painter, then, know the proper
goodness of rebus or picture? Or does he ever even
know the maker, the cobbler and the smith, or has only
the man who understands the use of such things,
the baramen?" "Most true." "And shall we not
say that the same holds true of everything?"

"What do you mean?" "That there are some three
goodnesses concerned with everything, the way's art's,
the maker's, and the instigator's." "Yes." "Now do not
the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of every
implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the
maker's, as for which each is made or by nature adapted?"

"That is." "It quite necessarily follows, then, that the
maker's doing of anything is the one who knows most of
it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the
good or bad effects in use of the thing he boins. As,
for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-
maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in
fluting, and will order the kind that must be made,
and the other will obey and serve him." "Of course.
The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about
the goodness or the badness of the flute, and the
other, believing, will make them." "Yes." "Then in
the report of the same implement the maker will have
seen who do things for others know more about them
than they do, or when they are done, or if fewer
know more than others. Nor easily disagrees with
them, since he is in the art or thing. Plato says that the
correct judgment of a work of art must know such things, first, what it is;
more, that it is true and right, and, third, that it is good.

For the reference of beauty to see Hipp. Meg., 285 a.©
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right belief about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge. “Certainly.” “And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will be, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion?” “Neither.” “Then the imitator will neither know nor opin rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations.” “It seems not.” “Most charming, then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations.” “Not at all.” “Yet still he will none the less imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude.” “Why, what else?” “On this, then, as we seem, it is fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play, not to be taken seriously, and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or hexameters, are all altogether imitators.” “By all means.” “In heaven’s name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?” “Yes.” “And now again, to what

Note: The note in the Greek is not translated because of errors above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of 621β below. 621β

*CF. This does not contradict Book V, 477a-479b. For the opinion and knowledge cf. 430a and What Plato Really Said, 517, on Men 99 ff. 

*原文是“Socrates is good because of certain acts. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of 621β below”.

*Note: The note in the Greek is not translated because of errors above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of 621β below.
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"element 4 in man is its function and potency related?"

"Of what are you speaking?" "Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far does not appear equal."

"Why, no."

"And the same things appear best and straight to those who view them in water and out, or conceave and conceive, owing to similar errors of vision about colours, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so some-painting in its exploration of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of wretched, and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances."

"True." "And have not measuring and numbering and weighing proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned and numbered or even weighed? Certainly."

"But this surely would be the function of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates." "Why, yes of that."

"And often when this has measured and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary."

"Yes."

"And did we not say that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?"

"And we were right in affirming that."

"The part of the soul, then, that opines in..."
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contradiction if measurement could not be the same with that which confers to it." "Why, no."

But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul."

"Surely." "Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul." "Necessarily."

This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in its accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and in its companion and friend for no sound and true purpose."

"By all means," said he. "Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring."

"It seems so."

"Does that," said I, "hold only for vision or does it apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry?"

"Pr presumably," he said, "to that also."

"Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy from painting but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part."

"So we must."

"Let us, then, put the question thus: Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have faced will or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Do we find anything else but this?"

"Nothing."

"Is a man, then, in all of this one mind with himself, just as in the domain of sight there was fraction

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and steife and he hold within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things—so also in our actions there is division and strife of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment times with counter

self-contradictions." "Rightly," he said, "very rightly," said I; "but what we then omitted must now, I think, be set forth. "What is that?" he said. "When a good and reasonable man," said I, "experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too, that he will bear it more easily than the other sort." "Assuredly," said he. "But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate in his grief?" "That," he said, "is rather the truth." "Tell me now this about him: Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself?" "He will be more much more restrained," he said, "when he is in view." "But when left alone, I fancy, he will present himself many aversions which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing." "So it is," he said.

See West Plato Said, p. 393, on Gorg. 492 a 2. 5 c.

Cf. 54c 5, and p. 394, note e, in 493 b 2. 6 a 2.

Plato sometimes pretend to remedy an omission to correct himself by an av-wrong. See in Book 9, 57 2, 58 2, 59 2, and Tim. 63 c.

291 d 4.

This suggests the doctrine of assimilation as at

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VI. "Now it is not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way so his grief is the base feeling itself?"

"Thus,

"And in the world there are two opposite impulses - a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things from him?"

"(Of course), "And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads, and direct?"

"How so?"

"The law, I suppose, declares that it is here to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chance and modify, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things and if it advantages nothing to take them hard and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern, and our getting checks, the very thing we need to turn to our aid as quickly as possible in each case."

"What thing," he said, "do you mean?"

"To deliberate," I said, "about what has happened to you, and, as it were in the fall of the dice, to determine the movements of our others with reference to the numbers that turn up in the way that reason indicates would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clasping one's hands to the skies and shouting the time in salvation, ever to assume the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the curing of what..."
the Republic, Book X.

has fallen, banishing the gods by therapy. "That certainly," he said, "would be the best way to face adversity and deal with it." "Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason." "Obviously." "And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory or our suffering and impels us to lamentation and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice?" "Yes, we will say that." "And does not the figurative part of us present many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a constipated mob assembled in the theatre? For the representation imitates a type that is alien to them." "By all means." "And it is not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed to please it, if he is to win favour with the multitude, but is devoted to the fictive and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?" "It is obvious." "This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart of the painter; for he resembles him in that his actions are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be

* cf. Sph. B 201 b 3, 201 c 6, with Ov. Met. 1. 190; 230 a. 4

** see Aristotelian society

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... OF
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justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state one puts more power in power and turns the city over to them and ruins (the better men). Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the aniconic poet acts up to such individual soul a vicious constancy by fashioning phantasm cells removed from reality, and by varying it with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing one, now, the other." By all means."

VII. "But we have not yet brought our chief account against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for shame." "How could it be otherwise, if it really does that?" "I listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer's 2 or some other of the writers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief, and is lamenting a long time in his laments or orating and beating his breast, feels pleasure," and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, and we praise an excellent poet the one who more strongly affects us in this way. "I do know it, of course." "But when in our own lives some affection comes to us, you are also aware that we frame ourselves upon the opposite, as our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman?" "I dare not say," "Do you think, then," said I. "I am not sure.

"This is qualified in 387 a-388 a, by add 'nothing concludes.'
[Page 459]"
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

...this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character thus we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abandon it but take pleasure and approve?" (No, by Zeus, he said," it does not seem reasonable.") "Oh yes!"

1. "if you would consider it in this way." "In what way?"

2. "If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes, was forcibly restrained, and that his hungered for tears and a good cry and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire those things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then recovers its guard over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is so shameful to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandoned himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this pecuniary pleasure is so tough that no pity and would not consent to forfeit it by indulging the poesy altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably now upon ourselves."

3. "For after feeling that the emotion of pity there is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings."

4. "Most irritatingly requiring one and another of some kind, for the noble grief we should have with our fellows, and if we have we should have with them, we must over the path of the polite and gather the sight of the poets.

This anticipates the idea of the "coward" in modern psychology, talking among the Episcopal Church, 400, which is frequently misinterpreted; "Gnomes, vol. 40, 3.

For the psychology of L. 608 a and b, see cons. 368 c. v.; 443 e.

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true," he said. "Does not the same principle apply to the laughable, namely, that if in comic representation or for that matter in private talk, you take into

pleasure in buffoonery that you would blush to practice yourself, and do not detest them as base, you are doing the same thing as in the case of the politics? For here again what you reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, 'estrained in yourself' when it falls to play the clown, you receive in turn, and so fostering its prudish impudence, let yourself go for that often you are aware you become yourself a spooked in private." "Yes, indeed," he said.

And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions, the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it warms and fosters these feelings when we sought to do it to dry them up, and it exhilarates them as our rulers when they sought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of some and more miserable." "I cannot deny it," said he.

"Then, Glaucon, 'said I, 'when you meet yoursmen of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas, and that for the conduct and refinement of human life he is worthy of our study."

"It is not to be said only, Homer. Thea. 177 a, Soph. 396 c, is to be read. Theoc. 323 f. commen. with Arist., iv. 3. a. William's, 'Iliac' and "Euphorus, p. 346, fantastically says that it means go and refer to Hellas. He compares x and 3. But see Lassus 350 a, c. supra 390 c."

"I am, for my part, as far as the Poet, Soph. 396 e is to be read, so agrees Aesch. *II. 154 b, c, supra 390 c, in its reference to this passage."
PLATO

and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet; we must love *a* and elevate *us* to do the best we can, and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the panegyric of good men. For you are admitted to the honeyed muse in joy or pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best. Must true," he said. VIII. "Let us then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, such was her character. For reason constrained us. And let us further say to her, lest she should us for harshness and rudeness, that there is from of old a quarter between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as 'the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble of gods,'

Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
Wordsworth, "A Poet's Epistle:"
Philosopher: a wearing gare,
One that would peep and bawl
Upon his mother's grave.

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"Surely, Astylus, says another, "Les Tortes de
Let us reason that in philosophy we are generally in common ignorance
with the poets. ... The philosophers agreed that the poets
should not pass; that the city, the attendant, the attendant and the
attendant."

Wilmot, "Platon, ἃ παντεὶ, conjectures that these
sentences are from Sophocles; cf. also did, in pp. 366-367.

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and the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good, and the subtle thinkers who reason that after all they are poor, and countless others are tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let it be declared that, if the minstic and dulcet poetry can show any reason for her existence in a well-governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the same it would be impious to betray what we believe to be the truth.* Is not that so, friend? Do not you yourself feel her magic and especially when Homer is her interpreter?** "Greatly." "Then may she not justly return from this exile after she has passed her defence, whether in lyric or other measure? By all means." "And we would allow her advocates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause in prose without metre, and show that she is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man. And we shall listen benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us if it can be shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit." "How could we help being the painers?" said he.

But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be, neverless refrain, so we, 1

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1 * Cf. p. 160, note 3, in 394 c. 1
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

"Owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine* politics of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves as we listen the reason that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing that boys hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the poesy in his soul and must believe we have said about poetry. "By all means," he said, "I concur." "Yes, for great is the struggle," I said, "dear Glaucon, a far greater content than we think it, that determines whether a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honour or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us to be carefree of righteousness and all excellence." "I agree with you," he replied, "in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too."

"And yet," said I, "the greatest rewards of sense and the praises proposed for her we have not set forth." "You must have in mind an incomparably great* magnitude," he replied, "if there are other

* For republics of Phædrus 114 b, 77 a.
14. 60 101 b, p. 412, note d.
13. Phædrus 114 b, 107 c, Phædrus 347 a, (295 b).
12. Bk. iii, 920 e
8. Phædrus 465 c, 599 a, Phædrus 584 b, 588 a, 588 a, (591 a), Phædrus 125 a.
7. Phædrus 465 a, 599 a, 584 b, 588 a, 588 a, (591 a), Phædrus 125 a.
things greater than those of which we have spoken,"

4 What great thing," said I, "could there be in a little time?" For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time.

5 Nay, it is nothing," he said. "What then? Do you think that an immortal thing taught to be seriously concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all time?"

6 "I think so," he said; "but what is this that you have in mind?"

7 "Have you never perceived," said I, "that our soul is immortal and never perishes? And he, looking me in the face in amusement, said: "No, by Zeus, not I; but are you able to declare this?"

8 "I certainly ought to be," said I, "and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard."

9 "It is for me," he said: "and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard.

10 "I am sure of good and evil, do you not?"

11 "I do." "Is your notion of them the same as mine?"

12 "What is it?"

13 "That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the

* Cf. on 486 a. p. 9, note f and 490 b.


3抬席子 cf. Charmides 152 d.

4 Charmides is surprised in spite of 486 b. Many uncertain meanings of πρᾶξις have been drawn from the fact that in spite of the difficulty, 486 b, 490 b, 490 d, 491 a, 492 a, 492 d, it seems to mean πρᾶξις (a thing immortal as itself.

5 Tetep: 341 a. The word is used for the soul, which is a little different, Hesiod, v. 127: ἔτη τοίχα τις θάνατον.

THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X

...good..." "Yes, I think so," he said. "How about this: Do you say that there is for everything its special good and evil, as for example for the eyes albumin, for the entire body disease, for grain mildew, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil and disease?" "I do," he said. "Then when one of these evils comes to anything does it not make the thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally disintegrate and destroy it?" "Of course." "Then the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it, nothing else remains that could, for obviously it good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will that which is neutral and neither good nor evil."

"How could it?" he said. "If, then, we discover anything that has an evil which vitrates it, yet is not able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon know that of a thing so constituted there can be no destruction?" "That seems likely," he said. "Well, then," said I, "has not the soul something that makes it evil?" "Indeed it has," he said, "all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice and baseness and cowardice and ignorance." "Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And which, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it is no longer a body at all, in like manner in all the

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435 a 28 όμοια πυρηναίου δικαίου.
PLATO
examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nothingness. And that is what we spoke of in our case? "Yes." "Come, then, and consider the soul in the same way." Do injustice and other wickednesses dwelling in it, by their inwelling and attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring it to death and separate it from the body? "They certainly do not do that," he said. "But surely," said I. "It is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of something else destroys a thing while its own does not." "Yes, unreasonable." "For observe, Glaucon," said I, "that we do not think it proper to say of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness of foods themselves, whether it be slowness or rottenness or whatever it is; but when the badness of the foods themselves engenders in the body the defect of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed owing to these foods, but by its own vice, which is disease. But the body being one thing and the foods something else, we shall never expect the body to be destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it by nature." "You are entirely right," he replied. "X. On the same principle," said I. "If the badness of the body does not produce in the soul the thorn that his argument, that the soul can only be destroyed by an unary (so to speak) in part, matters, is sound. The relation of the soul to the body, including death, cannot touch the soul. And what we see in our experiment, disprove the soul.

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...we shall never expect the soul to be destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own...it is the soul that is, by the evil of another. "That is reasonable," he said. "Either then, we must refuse this and swear that we are mistaken, or so long as it remains satisfied, we must never say that by fever or any other disease, or hurt by the knife at the throat or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of these things, until it is proved the contrary to these effects of the body the soul itself becomes more united and unified. But when an evil of something else occurs in a different thing and the evil that belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, we must suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else in that way destroyed." "But you may be sure," he said, "that nobody will ever prove this, that the soul of the dying are made more united by death." "But if anyone," said I, "dare to come to grips with the argument and say, in order to avoid being forced to admit the soul's immortality, that a dying man dies because more wicked and unjust, we will contest that, if what he says is true, injustice ought be fatal to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that those who recover it because it kills from its own inherent nature, those who have most of it, quickens, all those who have less more slowly, and not, as now..."
PLATO

In fact, happens, that the unjust die owing to this but by
the action of others who inflict the penalty. "Nor
crime happens after all if it is going to be fatal to its
But I rather think it will prove to be quite the con-
trary, something that kills others when it can, but
live with a fear, 8c. not only
"You say well," I replied, "for when the
natural vice and the evil proper to it comes to
and the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or
anything else, except that for which it is appointed;"
"Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever,
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"You say truly." "But," said I, "we must not suppose this, for reason will not suffer it; nor yet must we think that in its truest nature the soul is of the kind of thing that terms with infinite diversity and solvency and contradiction in and with itself." 114c. "How am I to understand that?" he said. "It is composed of many elements, not put together in the best way, as now appeared to us, to be the case with the soul." "It is not likely," I said, "that the soul is immortal, our recent argument and our other true nature we must view it not marred by communion with the body and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and thought we have stated the truth of its present appearance, and its condition as we have now contemplated it resembles that of the sea-god Glaucon, whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his soul, poikilia, poikiloteleia, 115a. "For the incorruptible body smooths down the soul, and the earthly undefined things in the mind that merely turn many things." Alkman, Hermans vi. 360, Euphor. 115b. 366 c, Apoll. arg. 115c. 115d. Athenaeus 221 a and x. Erk. Pind. vi. 116a. 520 c, Aristoph. 116b. 427, 7. Theogn. 116c. 116d. 1 Glaucon 5: Poems.
Ah, Glaucon, soul of man! Exulted by each side That since the sea began Hath urged against thy side.
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body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves to him, accretions of shells and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by sensual evil. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucus." "Where I?" said he. "To its love of wisdom. And we must note the things of which it has apprehensions, and the associations for which it yearns, as being itself akin to the divine and the immortal and eternal being, and so consider what it might be if it followed the goddess unreservedly and were raised by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped free of the rocks and barnacles which, because it now rests on earth, clings to it in wild profusion of earthly and sordid accretions by reason of those fountains that accounted me happy. And then one might see whether in its real nature it is manifold or simple in simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how. But for the present we have, I think, fairly well described its sufferings and its form it assumes in this human life of ours." "We certainly have," he said. XII. "Then," said I, "we have met all the other demands of the argument, and we have not invoked the rewards and penalties of justice as you said Homer

1 Cf. Claces, 158 A. Lseus 645 A, 663. S. c. Herakles
2 Cf. Plato 661 A, 663 A, Lseus 661 C.
4 "Cf. Plato's 'Republic,' pp. 42.
5 "Cf. Clases, 277 D, 277 E. Lseus 641 a, 171 B. Plato's 'Republic.'"
PLATO

and Heleod 4 do, but we have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul ought to do justice whether it possesses the ring of Gyges 1 or not, 2 or the helmet of Hades 3 to boot.

"Most true," he said. "Then," said I. "Glascoo, there can no longer be any objection, 3 'can there, to our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addition, all the various rewards and wages that they bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the man still lives and after his death?" "There certainly can be none," he said. "Will you then, return some thing you borrowed in the argument?" "What, pray?" I granted to you that the just man should seem and be thought to be unjust and the unjust just; for you thought that, even if the concealment of these things from gods and men was an impossibility in fact, nevertheless it ought to be conceded for the sake of the argument, 2 'in order that the decision might be made between absolute justice and absolute injustice. Or do you not remember?" "It would be unjust of me," he said, "if I did not. "Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute

A religious thinker may in his theology justify the ways of God in man by arguing that worldly happiness is not the true happiness, and yet elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the righteous is not forsaken even in this world. Cf. Plato, p. 33 32, Prox. v. 3 and passim. See Roman, Hist. de J u s t i t i a, II, p. 372. "He en en de ces pasages comme un thèse de prêcheuse de l'Evangile, insérer si on en fait des pièces de code, excellents si on n'y suit que l'expression "scandal de baptisme" sans mot moral."
PLATO

paro theon kai par' athevnavos, kai omos omw
logewn per ai'reseis dokeneito autes, tois kai kai

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that she in fact enjoys * from gods and men, and I ask
that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that
she may gather to the three * which she wins from the
seeming and bestows on her possessor, since she has
been proved to bestow the blessings that come from
the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek
and win her." "That is a just demand," he said.
"Then," said I, "will not the fact of these restorations
be that the gods certainly * are not unaware * of
the true character of each of the two, the just and the
unjust?" "We will restore that," he said. "And
if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the
gods * and the other hateful to them, as we agreed
in the beginning." "That is so,"
And shall we not agree that all things that come from the
gods work together for the best * for him that is dear to the
gods, apart from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a

* For the idiom δεινον έν θεον δεινον cf. 368 a 4 etc. . . .
* For the thought of Iod, vilt. 33. 11. 
* For the thought of Iod, vilt. 33. 11. 
* Cf. Plato, 39 a 2 and b. 
* ουδεν αυτού. Cf. 381 a 9. 
* This results the fact of Socrates in Apol. 41 a 10.
which the gods bestow upon the just." "So I think, he said. "But what," said I, "can we now to prevent the reality? Do not your smart
but wicked ones fare as those mean do who run
They bound mingibly away at the start, but in the end
are laughed to scorn and run off the field unmanned
and with their ears on their shoulders?" But the
true runnists when they have come to the goal receive
usual outcome for the just also, that towards the end
they have honour and bear away the prices from
with me if I say of them all that you said of the un
just? For I am going to say that the just, when they
choose, marry from what families they will, and give
place, and everything that you said of the one I now
speak of the other; and in turn I will say of the unjust
that the most of them, even if they escape
detection in youth, at the end of their course are
wretched and derided, and their old age is made miser
by the contumelies of strangers and townsmen.

a

\textit{Works and Days}, Frag. 2a, 409.English idiom would say, "with their tails between their legs." (Chambers, Hist. 1, 2, 20) " diescimuna." For the idea of \textit{The Laws} 720 c, Demosth. 16, 19, and for
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They are lashed and suffer all things which you truly say are unfit for ears polite. Suppose yourself to have heard me a repetition of all that they suffer, and, as I say, consider whether you will bear with me."

"Assuredly," he said, "for what you say is just."

XIII. "Such then while he lives are the priests, the wages, and the gifts that the just man receives from gods and men in addition to those blessings which justice herself bestowed."

"And right fair and abiding rewards," he said. "Well, these," I said, "are nothing in number and magnitude compared with those that await both after death.

And we must listen to the tale of them," I said, "in order that each may have received in full what is due to be said of him by our argument." "Tell me," he said, "since there are not many things to which I would more gladly listen."

"It is not, let me tell you," I said, "the tale of Ateus told that I shall unfold, but the tale of a warrior bold, to wit, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian."

He once upon a time was slain in battle, and when the corpse was taken up on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact, smitten of Plato's method of putting his relations in this form. See Chastagn, "Histoire de Rome," p. 16. See also Valer., "Epitome," pp. 144 E., and Aetius, "Historia," p. 234.


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and having been brought home, at the moment of his 
funeral, on the tenth day as he lay upon the pyre, 
revolved, and often coming to mind related what 
he said, he had seen in the world beyond. He said 
that when he saw it he went forth from his body, he journeyed with a 
great company and that they came to a mysterious 
region where there were two openings side by 
side in the earth, and above and over against them in the 
heaven two others, and that judges were sitting 
between these, and that after every judgment 
with the righteous journeyed to the right and upwards 
through the heaven with tokens attached to them 
in front of the judgement passed upon them, and that 
they, by the road to the left and downward, 
they too wore signs of all that had befallem 
them, and that when he himself drew near they told 
him. 

691 a. Cf. Phaedo 297 a. In 215 b, where there is no 
description but simply the statement that the souls 
are mythology and an account of the 
heavenly regions. In 288 b, he so 
interested, and the soul of Plato 
was able to ascend by the means of the 
drills, the soul of Socrates 
was at the pyre of the 
(see 691 a, 683 a.) But note of these 
their ancestors. In Memoriam, 
their ancestors. In Memoriam, 
There remained unanswered:
He said it is something small.
The life of that Evangelist.
Cf. also Luke xx. b. "If they be not Manes and 
prophets neither will they be persuaded through 
them from the dead." But in that very parallel Law and the rich man in 
Abraham's bosom and the rich man in 
For the indirect reference of p. 507, note f, on 617 a.
For the description of the place of judgement of 

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691 a, 691 b. For "right" and "left." From the story of the last judgement, Matt. xxv. 31-34 and 41.
him that he must be the messenger to mankind to tell them of that other world, and they charged him to give ear and to observe everything in the place. And so he said that here he saw, by early opening of heaven, and earth, the souls departing after judgment had been passed upon them, while, by the other way of openings, there came up from the one in the earth souls full of squak and dust, and from the second there came down from heaven a second procession of souls clean and pure, and that those which arrived from time to time appeared to have come as it were from a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow and encamped there as at a festival, and acquaintances greeted one another and those which came from the earth questioned the others about conditions up yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared with those others. And they told their stories to one another, the one lamenting and wailing as they recalled how many and how dreadful things they had suffered and seen in their journey beneath the earth—it lasted a thousand years, while those from heaven related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond words. To tell it all, Glaucon would take all our time, but the sum, he said, was this. For all the wrongs they had ever done to anyone and all whom they had injuriously injured they had paid the penalty in turn tenfold for each, and the measure of this was by periods of a hundred years each, so that on the assumption

* Cf. the rich man's report that a messenger be sent to his brethren, Jude v. 31.

* Cf. Rom. viii. 28, 39, 61, 65, vii. 29, 30, iv. 18, 41, vii. 24, Rom. vii. 31, ii. 29, viii. 23, 26, vii. 29, Eph. v. 6, 20, Col. i. 20, 21, viii. 23, 24. The Ideal Hindu length of life is said to be 100 years.
that this was the length of human life the punishment might be ten times the crime; so for example that if anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to slavery, or had been participant in any other iniquity, they might receive in requital pains tenfold for each of those wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of kindness and been just and holy men they might receive their due reward in the same measure; and other things not worthy of record he said of those who had just been born and lived but a short time; and he had still greater requitals to tell of pious and impious towards the gods and parents and of self-slaughter. For he said that he stood by when one was questioned by another 'Where in Aristocles the Great! Now Aristocles had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time and had put to death his old father and his elder brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as was the report. So he said that the one questioned replied, 'He has not come,' said he, 'nor will he be likely to come here.'

XIV. 'For indeed this was one of the dreadful sights we beheld, when we were near the mouth and about to issue forth and all our other sufferings were

For the words of Tob. 76 it seemsgamma, phi, then does not take up the problem of拉丁文is speech. Warrington says, 'and I make no doubt that the time is worthy to be remembered was the day of the prophecy, which appears to have given Plato much who did not at that time at least I quote in this

See also Bacon, Augementi Divinæ
ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others, the most of them, I say, tyrants. But there were some of private station, of those who had committed great crimes. And when these supposed that at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone of the incurably wicked3 of or of those who had not completed their punishment tried to come up. And Minos, he said, 'some men of Forty Aspects:1 who stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them 2 and bore them away. But Aristaeus and others they sound hand and foot and head and flung down and 1 Cf. Greg. 325 c. 336 c. Daniel, Aesop xii. 100 ff. Sermon. 2 Cf. Greg. 353 c. 354 c. Heiron, i. 251. 3 But most of all which in that dungeon by. Pull from high Places: courtesies or Ladies bawds. Lang. "Heiron of Ten." 4 Oh, Pux, what is power? Tantalas And Salopes were king long time ago. But now they lie in the Lake Unipous: The habs of hell are noisy with their war. 5 Cf. Greg. 325 c. and West Plate Said, p. 590. on Platon.
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in four days to a spot whence they discerned, extended from above throughout the heaven and the earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To this they came after going forward a day's journey, and they saw there at the middle of the light the extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven; for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the undergirders of tritons, holding together in like manner the entire revolving vault. And from the extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its book were made of sfantus, and the whole of this book and other kinds was consummated. And the nature of the wheel was this: Its shape was that of those in our world, but from his description we must conceive it to be as if in one great wheel, hollow and scooped out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one another, and in like manner another, a third, and a fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the wheels in all, lying within one another. Showing their


** Cf. Theophr. Enn. iv, 3 2, p. 36, in H. Schiller, "Pythagoras, etc."

*** Main (cité en exergue), "Les pléiades", p. 36. Ancien, c'était un très mauvais usage de lire le texte de la pléiade.

Mérites pour Platon, il est evident, le fait des dimensions et la Nécessité, le destin de la chose, la nature de sa simplicité, etc. Il n'était pas un simple considérer des objets, mais il était déterminé, d'une façon certaine, par des figures, etc. Il n'était pas un simple considérer des objets, mais il était déterminé, d'une façon certaine, par des figures, etc. Si nous voyons des systèmes de Pythagoriciens, etc.

† The Republic's 'wheel of the many planets' which is certain: Pythagorean in its essential character, but do not know of the universe, etc. Of the system of Pythagoreans, their central of the Nécessité, p. 273. If the name of the planets occur

With 504-517 cf. Lact. 502 a 6. Tim. 38 d, Note, Contra, ii, 3 5. If. The name of the planets occur

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Rims as circles from above and forming the continuous back of a single wheel about the shaft, which was driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now the first and outermost wheel had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, eighth that of the second; and that of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh brightest, that of the eighth took its colour from the seventh, which shone upon it. The colours of the second and fifth were like one another and more yellow than the two forsees. The third had the whitest colour, and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole in a circle with the same movement, but within the whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved gently in the opposite direction to the whole,2 and of these seven the eighth moved most swiftly, and next together with one another the seventh, sixth and fifth; and third3 in swiftness, as it appeared to them, moved the fourth with return upon itself, and fourth the third and fifth the second. And the spindle turned on the knees of Neoclitero, and up above so each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its resolution and uttering one sound, one note, and from all the eight there was

1 See note 1, p. 331.
2 and these A2 Frohli: ἀλλὰ τὰ τέσσαρα D: ἄλλων F: αὐτῶν E: τῶν κύκλων οὖν ἄλλων τῆς ἀνακλίνεις γόμφρας, ἔτι ἡ τῶν κύκλων οὖν ἄλλων τῆς ἀνακλίνεις γόμφρας. See note 1, p. 331. This view that the planets

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The concord of a single harmony. And there were other three who sat round about at equal intervals, each one on her throne, the Eunuch\(^6\) daughters of Necessity, clad in white vestments with fillet\(^4\) bands, Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in unison with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer circumference of the spool, passing from time to time, Atropos with her left hand in like manner helped to turn the inner circle, and Lachesis alternately with either hand lent a hand to each.

\(^XV\) Now when they arrived they were straightway bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain prophet first intoned them to orderly intervals, and the spool took from the lap of Lachesis lots and portions of lives and went up to a lofty platform and stood. This is the world of Lachesis, the maiden of Nature scattered in her opening speech.

And stunned they with the music of the spheres.

Ode to Poetry. From Moro, p. 71. A-Goman rationalizes the thought:

\(^1\) Picture in Michelangelo’s Le Parte. Cf. Catullus \(4.308\) (\(4.757\) (\(4.851\) (\(4.852\)) (\(4.853\)) (\(4.854\)) (\(4.855\)).

\(^2\) See What Plato Said, p. 50, on Moro, 338 c.

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daughter of Necessity, "Souls that live for a day," now is the beginning of another cycle of mortal generation where birth is the beacon of death. No divinity shall cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own destiny. Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has no master over her, and each shall have more or less of her as he honours her or does her displease. The blame is in him who chooses: God is blameless."

So saying, the prophet sung the lute to me among them all, and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except himself, him they did not permit. And whoever took up a lot saw plainly what manner he had drawn. And after this again the prophet placed the patterns of lives before them on the ground, for more numerous than the assembly. They were of every variety, for there were of them all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were of them all kinds of animals and all sorts of human lives, for there were the tyrannies among them, some without till the end, and others without till the end:

"Zeiver, Nestle, p. 346, says that this looks like intensional correlation of Plato's 107 f. "The virtue is real, and the good is real: the best of the whole is the good, the worst of the whole is the evil, and the evil of the best is the virtue of the worst."

"Cf. Swinburne, "The Life of Man" (from Aristocles in Calypso):

"Life is the shadow of death."


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"With life before and after, and death beneath and above, for a day and a night and a dower, that his strength might endure for six days, and "The Garden of Persephone." "Here Eileithyia doth not abound."

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garies; and these were lives of men of repose for their
forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise and
prosperity and the high birth and the virtues of their
ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things,
and similarly of women. But there was no deter-
nation of the quality of soul, because the choice of
a different life inevitably determined a different
character. But all other things were commingled
with one another and with wealth and poverty and
sickness and health and the intermediate conditions.

---And these, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme
hazard for a man. And this is the chief reason why
it should be our main concern that each of us,
neglecting all other studies, should seek after and
study that thing---in any way he may be able to learn of and discover
the man who will give him the ability and the know-
ledge to distinguish the life that is good from that
which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose
the best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account
all the things of which we have spoken and estimating
the effect on the goodness of his life of their con-
junction or their severance, to know how beauty com-
mingled with poverty or wealth and combined with
that habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and
what are the effects of light and low birth and private
station and office and strength and weakness and
weakness of apprehension and dulness and all
similar nature and acquired habits of the soul, when

---For the Illus. A5: I. Thucyd. 1. 32. 8 epokes e elvoux, Aristot.
"c7, I90 a 597, 8. epokes e elvoux, "c7, 597 a 591.
---Cf. Plato, 599 a 591. 
---595 a 595. 
---596 a 596. 
---597 a 597. 
---598 a 598. 
---599 a 599. 
---600 a 600. 
---601 a 601. 
---602 a 602. 
---603 a 603. 
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blended and combined with one another, so that with consideration of all these things he will be able to make a reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature of his soul, weighing the worse life which that will tend to make it more just, and the better that which will make it more just. Pet all other considerations he will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best choice, both for life and death. And a man must take with him to the house of death an unsubstantial faith in that, that even there he may be undisturbed by riches and singular trumpery, and may not precipitate himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work away evil past cure and suffer still greater himself, but may know how always to choose in such things the life that is set up it the mean and shun the excess in either direction, both in this world so far as may be and in all the life to come; so this is the greatest happiness for men.

VI. "And at this time also the messengers from that other world reported that the prophet spoke thus: 'Even for him who comes forward last, if he make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is reserved an inaccessible life, no evil one. Let not the foremost in the choice be heedless or the last be discouraged. When the prophet had thus spoken he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang to seize the greatest tyranny, and that in his folly and greed he chose it without sufficient examination, and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating

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*The singular verb is used after plural subjects, because the subjects are united in the writer’s mind in the general idea. Cf. Rep. 363 e, Laws 623 c, Euth. 188 c.

1 See Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 28, Laws 640b400, and for the word εὐαγγέλιον see 309 a, Corp. 309 a 340.

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his own children, and other horrors, and that when he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and bewailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning of the prophet. For he did not blame himself for his woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit and not by philosophy: and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were uncorrected in suffering. But the most of those who came up from the earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen the sufferings of others, did not make their choice precipitately. For which reason also there was an interchange of good and evil for most of the souls, as well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at such return to the life of this world a man loved wisdom sanctly, and the lot of his choice did not fall out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from what was reported thence, that not only will he be happy here but that the path of his journey thither and the return to this world will not be underground and rough but smooth and through the heavens. For he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe how the several souls selected their lives. He said it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as the choice was determined for the most part by the habits of their former lives. He saw the soul that had been Orpheus, he said, selecting the life of a

* Cf. Phaedo 61 b, 62 a. Phaedr. 248-249, Tcm. 62 a-c, 63 b. For the idea of reincarnation in Plato see What Plato Said, p. 511, on Phaedo 81 a-80 b; vol. II 211.
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swan, because from hatred of the tribe of women, owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the soul of Thamyris choosing the life of a nightingale; and he saw a swan changing to the choice of the life of man, and similarly other musical animals. The soul

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that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion; it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which, because it remembered the adjudication of the arms of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred of the human race because of its sufferings, substituted the life of an eagle. Drawing one of the

middle lot the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the great honours attached to an athlete's life and could not pass them by but snatched at them. After her, he said, he saw the soul of Episcil, the son of Pasiphae, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts

woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the

boffon Thersites, clothing 003 in the body of an ape. And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from memory of its former talks having flung away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business, and with difficulty found it lying in some corner forecasted by the others, and, upon seeing it said

Out of this place, The Republic, p. 574, says: "If you know anything as all of Indian fable, he must have

synched that the swan (Hermes) in the Euphronion must be swan, and to say, as he did, that this

Orpheus chose the life of a swan, refusing to be born again a man, is just an allegorical way of saying that he

passed us into the spiritual life... One is taught to cap this with Homer:

"Oh, do not die, for I shall hate you. But when they were gone That Do I shall not celebrate. When I remember their worth, "

not die, for I shall hate you. But when they were gone That Do I shall not celebrate. When I remember their worth, "

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that it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner, of the other beasts some entered into men* and into one another, the *mnd into wild creatures, the just transformed to tame, and there was every kind of mixture and combination. But when, to conclude, all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of their lots, they were marshalled and sent before Luechus. And she sent with each, as the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius* that he had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first to Clotho, under her hand and her turning* of the spindle to repay the destiny of his lot and choice; and after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Atropos* to make the web of its destiny* irreversible, and then without a backward look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity. And after it had passed through that, when the others also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of Oblivion, through a terrible and stifling heat, for it was made of trees and all plants, and there they perished at the side by the River of Forgetfulness."
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οὐ τὸ ἐδώρ ὅργανον ὀδὴν στέγει. μέγαν μὲν οἴον τι τοῦ Ἀθηναῖ τόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πως,
τὸ γὰρ δρόμεις μὴ συναγωγέων πλῆθος σώματος ἐπὶ μέγαν τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ πάντων ἀπελαθθεῖσαν.

B. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθήσαν καὶ μέσα νῦν πάντως γενόμενα,
βρασθῆναι τε καὶ σκοτεινωθῆναι, καὶ ἐνέκειται ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἄλλας δύο ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
δύο δέ μὲν ἄλλως καλοθητικὰ πεῖσιν δόξας καὶ ἄλλοις εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἠλπίσωσιν, οὐκ ἀδίκου, ἀλλ' ἐξόρας
ἀποφθέγματα ἀπὸ κάθε ἑλκίζουσαν ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.

C. Ὑποστῆναι, μέγα ἐποίησις καὶ σιγὴ

C. ἁπάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πολλάκις εἰς διαφορομεθα καὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ μακρανόμοιτα, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐμὲ συνάντησα.

D. χωρίτσῃς ἀδέσποτον ψυχήν καὶ δυνητικὴ
πᾶνα μὲν ἕκαστον ἀνέκαθεν, πάντα ἔστι σαφώς, τήν ἄνω ἴσον δὲ ἐξίσος καὶ δεκατομμύρια
μετὰ ἄνων τοιαύτα τρεῖς ἐξυπνοεῖσθαι, ὅπως καὶ

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whose waters no vessel can contain. They were all required to drink a measure of the water, and those who were not saved by their good sense drank more than the measure, and each one is he drank forgot all things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly wakened thereon, one this way, one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars. For himself, he said, was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and in what way he returned to the body he said he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight he saw himself at dawn, lying on the funeral pyre. And as, Glaucon, the tale was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the world. But if we are guided by no we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever.

* "In Tim. 4:1 we ask each soul in given a star as its guide. Cf. Aristotle, Frag. 838 b, 14, 'When a ship is stranded..." with the Ptolemaic epitome to "Leto..." 518

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that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our award, as the victors in the games you about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well.""

is a good Stoic doctrine, and that the idea that only the wise and good man can be dear to himself is found in the last sentence of Plato's Republic." Cf. also Soph. O.C. 309 "...ναί λέγει ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν..."

For the thought of Simp. 312.2 ἢ νῦν ὁ ὥριμος καὶ ὁ μετέχων..." Cf. Pol. L. 192.3 on 380 e. The quiet solemnity of καθὼς ἀκούει διὰ τὸν ἄφθαρτον is the same characteristic of style that makes Plato begin his Laws with the words, and Dante close each of the three sections of the Divine Comedy with "stella."